Reviewing the post-2015 sustainable development goals and partnerships: a proposal for a multi-level review at the high-level political forum by Beisheim, Marianne
www.ssoar.info
Reviewing the post-2015 sustainable development
goals and partnerships: a proposal for a multi-level
review at the high-level political forum
Beisheim, Marianne
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Forschungsbericht / research report
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Beisheim, M. (2015). Reviewing the post-2015 sustainable development goals and partnerships: a proposal for a
multi-level review at the high-level political forum. (SWP Research Paper, 1/2015). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-417430
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
SWP Research Paper 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
German Institute for International  
and Security Affairs 
Marianne Beisheim 
Reviewing the Post-2015 
Sustainable Development 
Goals and Partnerships 
A Proposal for a Multi-level Review at the 
High-level Political Forum 
RP 1 
January 2015 
Berlin 
 All rights reserved. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik, 2015 
SWP Research Papers are 
peer reviewed by senior 
researchers and the execu-
tive board of the Institute. 
They express exclusively 
the personal views of the 
author(s). 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik  
German Institute  
for International  
and Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Germany 
Phone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1863-1053 
Translation by  
Deborah Anne Bowen 
(Updated English version of 
SWP-Studie 16/2014) 
 Table of Contents 
 5 Problems and Recommendations 
 7 Sustainable Development:  
Changes at the United Nations Level 
 7 Starting point: Deficits in implementation 
 8 The Future Review at the High-Level Political 
Forum on Sustainable Development 
 10 Reviews: Analysis of positions and criteria 
 15 Existing Review Processes:  
Strengths and Weaknesses 
 15 The Annual Ministerial Review and other 
Reviews in the UN Development System 
 17 The Universal Periodic Review in the area of 
Human Rights 
 18 Further sectoral, regional, and national reviews 
 21 Lessons learned 
 24 Proposal for a “Commit and Review” Process 
for the Post-2015 SDGs 
 24 First Cycle: Reviewing national commitments 
 27 Second cycle: Reviewing the implementation of 
national commitments 
 28 The design of the HLPF Review at the global level 
 32 Reviewing Partnerships for 
Sustainable Development 
 32 Recent developments 
 33 Options for an improved accountability 
framework for partnerships 
 35 Summary and Outlook 
 36 Acronyms 
 
 
  
 
Dr. Marianne Beisheim is a Senior Associate in SWP’s  
Global Issues Division 
Parts of this SWP Research Paper have been written 
in the context of the research project “Transnational 
Partnerships for Sustainable Development”. From 
2014–2017, the project will investigate whether and 
how lessons learned about the conditions affecting 
the success and impact of partnerships for sustainable 
development influence future partnership (meta-) 
governance at the national, transnational, and UN 
levels. Funded by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG), this project forms part of the Research Center 
SFB 700 on “Governance in Areas of Limited State-
hood” (see www.sfb-governance.de/ppp). 
 
Latest publications 
Marianne Beisheim and Andrea Liese (Eds.) 2014 
Transnational Partnerships:  
Effectively Providing for Sustainable Development? 
Basingstoke et al.: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Marianne Beisheim, Andrea Liese, Hannah Janetschek, and 
Johanna Sarre 2014 
Transnational Partnerships: Conditions for Successful 
Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood 
in Governance (Special Issue on External Actors, State-
Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited 
Statehood), 27 (4), 655–73. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Problems and Recommendations 
Reviewing the Post-2015 Sustainable Development 
Goals and Partnerships 
A Proposal for a Multi-level Review at the 
High-level Political Forum 
In September 2015, the heads of state and government 
of the United Nations (UN) Member States are scheduled 
to decide on the Post-2015 agenda. This is to include 
not only a list of universal Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) but also a mechanism for monitoring and 
review. What would the review mechanism have to 
look like to contribute to the implementation of sus-
tainable development? 
Up to now, the UN has had almost no means at its 
disposal to effectively motivate or urge Member States 
to implement sustainable development measures. In 
the case of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs, 
deadline 2015), for example, the UN mainly utilized 
procedures for data collection and monitoring. The 
Annual Ministerial Review (AMR), introduced in 2005, 
was celebrated as an important achievement, but is 
in reality a rather weak instrument. 
The High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable 
Development (HLPF) was launched in July 2013 to pro-
vide political leadership and guidance, and to work 
towards a global transformation to sustainable devel-
opment. But how should it go about actually playing 
this role? An important element of its work will be the 
review mechanism envisioned under the HLPF mandate, 
which is set to replace the AMR starting in 2016. 
A review process builds on and goes beyond 
monitoring and data collection. In this framework, 
the governments are asked critical, analytical ques-
tions to determine the reasons for their successes and 
failures and to recommend measures needed to im-
prove goal attainment in the future. In recent years, 
international policy has been making increased use 
of reviews to further the realization of internationally 
agreed policy goals on the national level. What the 
planned review mechanism of the HLPF will look like 
in detail has not yet been decided. The review process 
has been the subject of dialogue in the General Assem-
bly (GA) twice in 2014 and was also discussed at the 
annual meeting of the HLPF in early July. Moreover, 
there have been a few informal meetings on the subject. 
The present study examines the debate taking place 
over the review process, highlights the positions of 
selected key actors, discusses criteria for designing a 
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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
review, applies these to analyze and assess existing 
review systems. Finally, it develops specific proposals 
for a universal, state-led, participatory, multi-level 
“Commit and Review” process that could serve as 
a central component of the follow-up process for the 
Post-2015 goals. 
Why we should start thinking about it now 
It is important to start thinking about the follow-up 
to the Post-2015 agenda and goals now. Not only could 
the review process contribute to the more consistent 
implementation of the global sustainable development 
goals in the future: If it is designed wisely, it can also 
help to overcome major deadlocks in negotiations 
over the Post-2015 agenda between North and South, 
which are likely to continue up to September 2015. 
What are the sticking points? First, there is disagree-
ment among donor countries, developing countries, 
and newly industrialized countries over the level of 
funding needed to achieve the agreed goals and over 
the principle of common but differentiated respon-
sibilities (CBDR). Second, Member States are interested 
in finding a way to differentiate and translate the 
global Post-2015 goals into national-level targets in 
such a way that individual national conditions, prior-
ities, and capacities are adequately taken into account. 
The proposed review process could address both prob-
lems; instead of a one-size-fits-all approach, it could 
provide a tailored solution for the particular country 
in question—whether it is a developing, newly indus-
trialized, or industrialized country. The review could 
thus play an important role in the institutional reforms 
that are needed to deal constructively with the shifts 
in power between North and South. 
To promote the creation of an effective HLPF review 
mechanism, Germany should volunteer to go through 
the first round of the review process in 2016. Inter-
national expectations are high regarding Germany’s 
potential to lead the way with innovations in the area 
of sustainable development. The German government 
could use the review process as an occasion to show 
what transformative measures it is undertaking to 
achieve the Post-2015 goals at home and worldwide, as 
well as what opportunities and challenges this entails. 
The German Sustainable Development Strategy is 
already scheduled for a regular revision by 2016—that 
provides a good basis to present it in the first review 
cycle. Not least of all, the German government should 
elucidate how it plans to fulfill its commitments to 
provide for means of implementation in the context 
of its development cooperation. 
Such a positive and proactive contribution, if set 
within the framework of the review mechanism pro-
posed here, could foster mutual trust, help to build 
the much-vaunted Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development, and create new momentum for multi-
lateral action. 
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 Sustainable Development: Changes at the United Nations Level 
 
Starting point: Deficits in implementation 
When the participants in the Rio+20 Conference on 
Sustainable Development (UNCSD) agreed on the out-
come document entitled The Future We Want,1 many 
commentators warned that it would only prove valu-
able if the reform processes it proposed were actually 
implemented. Undeniably, deficits in implementation rep-
resent the biggest problem the UN faces in the area of 
sustainable development. 
Already in 1987, the report Our Common Future of 
the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment, a body created by the UN in 1983 under the 
direction of Gro Harlem Brundtland, introduced the 
concept of sustainable development. This was conceived 
as a form of development that “meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” and shape their 
own lives.2 The report recommended harmonizing 
economic growth, social development, and 
environmental protection by means of integrated 
policy strategies. In 1992, the heads of state and 
government convened in Rio de Janeiro for the first 
“Earth Summit,” the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED). The goal of 
this conference was to translate the concept of 
sustainable development into an agenda for political 
action. Among other key documents, the first Rio 
Conference adopted Agenda 21, which formulated 
recommendations for action and introduced financial, 
technical, and other instruments of implementation. 
In addition, Agenda 21 designated nine key social 
groups (the Major Groups) that would contribute to the 
realization of this action program. Parallel to this, the 
participants adopted the non-binding Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development specifying 27 principles of 
sustainable development, such as the precautionary 
and polluter pays principles, and the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR). 
These principles subsequently influenced not only the 
1  United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), The Future 
We Want, UN-Doc. A/Res/66/288 (New York, September 2012). 
2  World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), Our Common Future (Oxford, 1987), 43. 
continued negotiations but also many national 
policies. The Rio Declaration also affirmed the 
sovereign right of states to “exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies”—a right that still today 
is tenaciously asserted by many UN Member States. 
The UN created the Commission on Sustainable 
Development (CSD) in December 1992 with the man-
date to both advance and monitor the implemen-
tation of the Rio commitments. It achieved this task, 
however, only to a limited extent. For this reason, 
the issue of how to improve the implementation of 
the Rio decisions was made an explicit focus of the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in Johannesburg. Yet from the outset, the sum-
mit was severely overshadowed by concerns related 
to increasing international economic competition 
related to globalization processes, and the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, and Member States 
showed little willingness to step up their sustainable 
development efforts. The outcome document adopted 
there—the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPoI)—fell 
far below the expectations of many conference par-
ticipants. Proposals for a ten-year program to promote 
sustainable consumption and production patterns 
were welcomed, as was the comparatively concrete 
formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The idea that all countries should develop national 
sustainable development strategies (NSDS) was also 
well-received. Germany submitted its own NSDS that 
same year.3 Overall, however, the JPoI was criticized 
for the non-binding nature of the agreed measures, 
its lack of financial commitments, and the absence of 
appropriate monitoring mechanisms. 
For this reason, at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, 
the discussion still focused largely on the implemen-
tation of sustainable development policies up to that 
point and the potential to improve implementation 
in the future. Consequently, the conference not only 
adopted resolutions on instruments for a sustainable 
economy (the “Green Economy” approach) and on 
3  German Federal Press Office, 10 Jahre Nachhaltigkeit “made in 
Germany.” Die Nationale Strategie für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung 
(Berlin, 2012). 
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Sustainable Development: Changes at the United Nations Level 
reforms to the institutional framework for sustainable 
development, but also approved a joint proposal put 
forward by the governments of Colombia and Guate-
mala to formulate a catalog of global Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).4 In September 2013, the 
UN General Assembly decided to merge the follow-up 
process on the Rio+20 Conference with the MDG fol-
low-up process, defining the Post-2015 development 
agenda. In July 2014, an intergovernmental open 
working group (OWG), mandated by the General Assem-
bly, presented its report with a proposal for 17 SDGs 
and 169 targets.5 In September 2014, the General 
Assembly decided that this proposal “shall be the main 
basis for integrating sustainable development goals 
into the Post-2015 development agenda”. On Decem-
ber 4th 2014, the UN Secretary-General presented his 
Synthesis Report on the Post-2015 agenda.6 It confirms 
the OWG’s proposal on SDGs and is the result of numer-
ous consultations and other key reports, including the 
report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts 
on Sustainable Development Financing (ICESDF) and 
the report of the Independent Expert Advisory Group 
on the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development 
(IEAG). 
The final round of intergovernmental negotiations 
on the Post-2015 Agenda starts in January 2015. In Sep-
tember 2015, the UN General Assembly is expected to 
adopt the Post-2015 Agenda. In contrast to the MDGs, 
the Post-2015 Agenda will be a universal agenda; the 
SDGs will apply to all countries and focus on trans-
formative change. While poverty eradication is still at 
the heart of the agenda, the current proposal for SDGs 
also covers issues such as the protection of ecosystems, 
sustainable consumption and production patterns, 
peace and governance, as well as inequality within 
and among countries. An agenda as broad as this one 
implies challenges for national-level implementation, 
measurement, monitoring, and accountability. Accord-
ingly, in mid-December 2014, Member States agreed 
that the Post-2015 Agenda should have four building 
4  On the outcomes of this conference see Marianne Beisheim, 
Birgit Lode, and Nils Simon, Rio+20 Realpolitik and its Implica-
tions for “The Future We Want,” SWP Comments 39/2012 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2012). 
5  Proposal of the Open Working Group for Sustainable Development 
Goals, 19 July 2014, http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ 
content/documents/4518SDGs_FINAL_Proposal%20of%20 
OWG_19%20July%20at%201320hrsver3.pdf (accessed Sep-
tember 29, 2014). 
6  UN, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All 
Lives and Protecting the Planet, Synthesis Report of the Secretary-
General On the Post-2015 Agenda (New York, December 2014). 
blocks: (a) a declaration; (b) sustainable development 
goals and targets; (c) a global partnership for sustain-
able development to mobilize the means of implemen-
tation; and, last but not least, (d) a section on follow-
up and review. 
Overall, these UN conferences have adopted solid 
resolutions and some have even resulted in written, 
concrete action programs. What has eluded the UN 
thus far, however, are effective means and instru-
ments to effectively promote the implementation of 
these statements of intent at the national level.7 
The Future Review at the High-Level Political 
Forum on Sustainable Development 
It was in this context that the decision was made in 
June 2012 at the Rio+20 Conference to create a High-
Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development 
(HLPF). The HLPF replaced the CSD and is designed to 
mainstream and strengthen sustainable development 
issues in the institutional structure of the UN. It con-
vened for the first time in September 2013 and will 
meet annually at the ministerial level under the 
auspices of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 
To enhance the political stature of the forum, it will 
also be convened every four years for a period of two 
days at the level of the heads of state and government 
under the auspices of the General Assembly. In con-
trast to the CSD, the HLPF has universal membership, 
which means that all Member States in the UN and 
in its specialized agencies can participate. 
According to its mandate, the HLPF is to provide 
“political leadership, guidance and recommendations” 
and to “follow up and review progress in the imple-
mentation of sustainable development commitments.”8 
But how should it go about actually playing this role—
and how can it do so more effectively than the CSD, 
which was criticized as a toothless body and a “talk 
shop”9? An important element of its work will be the 
7  Cf. The Roads from Rio. Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of 
Multilateral Environmental Negotiations, ed. Pamela S. Chasek 
and Lynn M. Wagner (New York and London 2012); Frank 
Biermann et al., Transforming Governance and Institutions for 
Global Sustainability, Earth System Governance Working Paper 
No. 17 (Lund and Amsterdam: Earth System Governance 
Project, November 2011). 
8  United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Format and 
Organizational Aspects of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustain-
able Development, UN-Doc. A/Res/67/290 (New York, August 
2013). 
9  See, e.g., Daniel Mittler, “Schwach, schwächer, CSD? 
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The Future Review at the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development 
review process, starting in 2016, which is envisioned in 
the HLPF mandate.10 Over the course of negotiations 
on the outcome document for the Rio+20 Conference, 
passages making reference to a review process were 
significantly weakened. It was thus encouraging that 
a regular review became part of the HLPF mandate 
after all. However, the wording of the resolution on 
this point is not very precise and therefore needs to 
be interpreted.11 
The HLPF mandate states that the new review pro-
cess is to be built on, and will subsequently replace, 
the existing review process for the MDGs: the Annual 
Ministerial Review (AMR) of the ECOSOC (see p. 15).12 
The AMR is considered relatively weak. Each year, 
about ten Member States deliver presentations on 
their achievements but neither do these follow a 
standardized reporting template nor is there a follow-
up.13 The main task of the future HLPF review is to 
monitor and follow up the implementation of the 
Post-2015 sustainable development agenda and goals.14 
Die Kommission für nachhaltige Entwicklung der Vereinten 
Nationen 15 Jahre nach Rio,” Vereinte Nationen 56, no. 1 (2008): 
16–19. The CSD also initially used National Voluntary Presen-
tations (NVPs), but discontinued this form of review when it 
did not prove effective. 
10  UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of the HLPF (see 
note 8), para. 7d and 8. The details will be explained below. 
11  In addition, according to the resolution on the HLPF, 
the UN General Assembly reserves the right “to review at 
its seventy-third session the format and the organizational 
aspects of the forum, unless otherwise decided”—which 
means there are many possibilities for its design at any time. 
See ibid., para. 29. 
12  Ibid., See para. 7a: “… building on and subsequently 
replacing the annual ministerial review as from 2016,” and 
para. 8d: “… shall replace the national voluntary presenta-
tions held in the context of the annual ministerial-level sub-
stantive reviews of the Council, building upon the relevant 
provisions of General Assembly resolution 61/16 of 20 Novem-
ber 2006, as well as experiences and lessons learned in this 
context.” See also President of UN ECOSOC, Preparing for the 
2014 High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, Draft 
Concept Note (New York, December 2013), para. 5: “… build 
on and subsequently replace the ECOSOC Annual Ministerial 
Review (AMR) as of 2016.” 
13  Howard White and Richard Black, “Millennium Develop-
ment Goals: A Drop in the Ocean?” in Targeting Development: 
Critical Perspectives on the Millennium Development Goals, ed. Richard 
Black and Howard White (New York, 2004), 1–24. The authors 
are especially critical of the “lack of accountability” as a major 
problem. 
14  UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of the HLPF (see 
note 8), para. 8: “Regular reviews, starting in 2016, on the 
follow-up and implementation of sustainable development 
commitments and objectives […] within the context of the 
In January 2015, intergovernmental negotiations will 
continue on the Post-2015 development agenda, on 
the universal SDGs, on the means of implementation, 
and on institutions for monitoring and review. In May 
2015, the Member States plan to focus on negotiating 
the framework for monitoring and review of imple-
mentation. From June 26 to July 8, 2015, the HLPF will 
discuss what its future review will look like—the title 
of the meeting being “Strengthening integration, im-
plementation and review—the HLPF after 2015.” 
The HLPF is considered among experts, UN Member 
States, and UN Major Groups as the “institutional 
home” of the future SDGs, with the HLPF review pro-
viding the cornerstone of a follow-up process.15 The 
precise structure of the review, however, remains un-
clear. To date there have been only a few preliminary 
negotiations over its format, mostly focusing on basic 
questions such as who and what should be reviewed 
and which principles (e.g., transparency, flexibility, 
etc.) should be applied. On May 1, 2014, an interactive 
dialogue on the issue took place at the UN General 
Assembly (GA).16 The second meeting of the HLPF in 
early July 2014 discussed the review under several 
points on its agenda.17 This was followed in September 
by a High-level Stocktaking Event of the President of 
the GA that also had a section on the “monitoring and 
review framework”.18 At the end of October, the Second 
post-2015 development agenda.” See also FAQ website of the 
HLPF: “Ultimately, it [the HLPF] will steer and review progress 
towards the sustainable development goals and the post-
2015 development agenda once Member States adopt them 
in 2015.” http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php? 
menu=1556 (accessed July 27, 2014). 
15  John W. Ashe, President of the 68th session of the General 
Assembly, stated in his opening address on September 24, 
2013: “The Forum should be the home for concrete guidance 
in the review of sustainable development goals, their imple-
mentation and monitoring.” http://www.un.org/en/ga/ 
president/68/pdf/statements/0924013Opening_of_HLPF.pdf 
(accessed July 28, 2014). 
16  See also. Summary of the Key Messages of the General Assembly 
Interactive Dialogue on “Elements for a Monitoring and Accountability 
Framework for the Post-2015 Development Agenda” (New York, May 
1, 2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/68/pdf/5202014 
Accountability_Framework_Dialogue_PGA_Summary.pdf 
(accessed July 28, 2014). 
17  High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development, 
Second Meeting, June 30–July 9, 2014, New York, http:// 
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1556 
(accessed July 28, 2014). The model of the HLPF review dis-
cussed in this paper was presented by the author on this 
occasion. 
18  Cf. Informal Summary, High-Level Stocktaking Event on the Post-
2015 Development Agenda: Contributions to the Secretary-General’s 
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Committee held a panel discussion on “Promoting 
accountability at all levels: monitoring the Post-2015 
development agenda”. Moreover, there have been a 
few more informal meetings.19 In November 2014, 
the Parliamentarian State Secretary in the German 
Federal Environment Ministry, Rita Schwarzelühr-
Sutter, and the State Secretary at the Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, Fried-
rich Kitschelt, hosted a talk at the Permanent Mission 
of Germany in New York to seek support for an effec-
tive review mechanism for the Post-2015 agenda.20 At 
the request of the UN Secretary-General, the regional 
commissions of the UN conducted consultations at the 
ministerial level, supported by surveys, to arrive at a 
better understanding of what kind of review the Mem-
ber States are envisioning.21 This informed the Syn-
thesis Report of the UN Secretary-General that was 
published on December 4th. The report suggests con-
structing a voluntary, state-led, participatory, and 
multi-tiered universal review process with a global 
component convened annually under the auspices of 
the HLPF. 
At the same time, there is debate among Member 
States about how central a role the review should play 
in the HLPF. Some of the wording in UN documents 
suggests that the eight days of meetings under the 
auspices of the ECOSOC might be dedicated primarily 
to the review.22 Member States have agreed, however, 
Synthesis Report – Informal Summary (New York, September 
2014), http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/68/pdf/stocktaking/ 
PGA%20Stocktaking%20Event%20-%20Summary.pdf (accessed 
October 1, 2014). 
19  For example, the workshops Making the High-Level Political 
Forum on Sustainable Development Work: How to Build an Effective 
“Review Mechanism” in New York on February 20, 2014 and May 
15, 2014, cf. http://www.iisd.ca/hlpf/hlpfsdw/html/crsvol221 
num1e.html and http://www.iisd.ca/hlpf/hlpfsdw2/html/ 
crsvol221num2e.html (both accessed July 17, 2014) and an 
Expert Group Meeting, organized by UNDESA, on the role of 
the HLPF in the Post-2015 framework, April 30 – May 1, 2014. 
20  Chair’s Summary: Possible Elements of a Review Mechanism for 
the Post-2015 Agenda—An Exchange of Views. Event at the German 
Federal Mission New York, November 19, 2014. 
21  Cf. Regional Ministerial Consultation with the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) on Sep-
tember 15 and 16, 2014: http://www.unece.org/post-2015/ 
regionalministerialconsultation2014.html (accessed October 
7, 2014). 
22  President of UN ECOSOC, Preparing for the 2014 High-Level 
Political Forum (see note 12), para. 5: “Under the auspices of 
ECOSOC, the President of ECOSOC is to convene the meetings 
of the forum annually for a period of eight days, including a 
three-day ministerial segment to be held in the framework of 
the substantive session of the Council.” These meetings are 
that ECOSOC reforms should not lead to an increase 
in the number of meeting days,23 which then limits 
the timeframe for the new process. Beyond this, there 
have been and continue to be fundamental disagree-
ments about the institutional design and chief tasks 
of the HLPF that the resolution providing the mandate 
for the review body did not actually resolve. Several 
Member States have never viewed the HLPF as an in-
dependent institution, but only as a “platform” for 
strategic discussion and agenda-setting. Accordingly, 
they are reluctant or even opposed to discussing ques-
tions of the HLPF’s decision-making authority or 
giving it a Bureau of its own or more secretariat capac-
ities.24 If the political will to strengthen the HLPF 
remains this low, however, it is unlikely that the HLPF 
will be able to launch an ambitious review process. 
Reviews: Analysis of positions and criteria 
In contrast to more descriptive monitoring processes, 
which are limited for the most part to observation and 
data collection for control and verification purposes, 
a review aims at a more detailed, critical analysis of 
the reasons behind successful implementation (or lack 
thereof). Its ultimate goal is quality assurance and to 
provide an evidence base for identifying changes that 
need to be made. 
The review is an instrument that has been gaining 
attention in global governance debates in recent years: 
It is seen as a means of addressing the often-faltering 
implementation of internationally agreed-upon targets 
at the national level. Failures to ratify or implement 
at the national level may, in turn, block multilateral 
to “build on and subsequently replace the ECOSOC Annual 
Ministerial Review (AMR) as of 2016,” and para. 15: “… [T]he 
forum must establish itself as an effective UN platform on 
sustainable development able to promote and review imple-
mentation of the SDGs and the post 2015 development 
agenda.” 
23  UNGA, Review of the Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 61/16 on the Strengthening of the Economic and Social 
Council, UN-Doc. A/Res/68/1 (New York, September 2013), 3: 
“Reforms […] should not lead to an increase in number of 
meeting days.” 
24  The UN Forum on Forests, for example, has a Bureau. 
It consists of one Chairperson and four Vice-Chairpersons 
elected from among the members in accordance with the 
principle of equitable geographical distribution. The Bureau 
has several responsibilities including the follow-up of deci-
sions, preparation for the subsequent session as well as the 
management and organization of sessions. Further, the Bureau 
chairperson represents the Forum in various other fora. 
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negotiations over other international goals. Moreover, 
if states are unable to agree on binding international 
targets based on a top-down model, they might switch 
to voluntary national commitments that then are to 
be monitored ex post by the international community. 
Negotiations over international climate change policy, 
for instance, have shifted in recent years to a bottom-
up approach, using a “Pledge and Review” process 
building on nationally determined contributions (see 
also p. 18). However, the success of this approach 
depends on the quality of the review system. For this 
reason, it is important to consider and negotiate such 
follow-up processes at an early stage. 
There is yet another argument to be made for dis-
cussing follow-up processes at an early stage: If there 
is uncertainty about what the follow-up mechanism 
will look like in negotiations over the Post-2015 goals, 
states will tend to limit their efforts to doing only 
what can be achieved in a business-as-usual scenario. 
However, if state representatives can see what to ex-
pect from the follow-up process to the Post-2015 goals, 
they may be more likely to agree on more ambitious 
commitments from the outset, especially if the pro-
cess does not consist only of assessments but provides 
support as well. 
It is also still unclear whether the HLPF review 
should focus on just one cross-cutting issue or Post-
2015 development goal each year, or whether it 
should instead take a more all-encompassing approach, 
focusing on several or even all of the goals and targets. 
This represents a trade-off; a compromise between 
thematic depth and breadth of the review process has 
yet to be found. 
The positions of Member States on the HLPF review—to 
the extent that they have formed opinions at all—have 
been mixed so far. There is a prevailing uncertainty 
about the type of mechanism that would be useful, 
and how strong a mechanism it should be. The idea 
of a voluntary, state-led review process, based on a 
mutual exchange of experiences and aimed at promot-
ing learning processes, has universal support.25 But 
there are disagreements about whether this type of 
review would be sufficient, and what elements of a 
stronger accountability mechanism, if any, should be 
integrated. Some countries (including Russia, the US, 
India, Mexico, and Venezuela) are concerned about 
25  This assessment rests on discussions on this subject and 
observations by the author in the context of workshops and 
negotiations at the UN in New York during the HLPF in July 
2014 as well as on other occasions. 
infringements on their sovereignty and critical of 
international oversight and the inclusion of non-state 
actors (experts or non-governmental organizations) in 
a review process. Many countries insist that the review 
must in any case be a state-led process. That such a 
review would have to be voluntary in order to gain 
majority support is already reflected in the text of the 
resolution. Therefore, states will have to be encouraged 
to participate actively. At the same time, there is an 
evident trade-off here: the review also must not be too 
soft or it runs the danger of being ineffective. The EU 
is calling for an effective and rigorous reporting 
mechanism, but has not yet spelled out exactly what 
that means.26 In New York, the informal “group of 
seven”, i.e., representatives from seven UN Member 
States (Egypt, Liechtenstein, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland), is working to 
foster more intensive discussion about the design of 
the HLPF review.27 The German government issued an 
ambitious non-paper in November 2014, opting for a 
regular review and a multi-layered model, following 
clear quality criteria and principles like transparency, 
inclusiveness, and efficiency.28 
A number of developing countries prefer that the 
reviews take place at the regional level, because they 
see their “peers”—that is, states that face comparable 
challenges—mainly as those located in the neighbor-
ing area. Other states, like India, are more skeptical of 
regional reviews and argue that regional consultations 
would be sufficient. All of the Member States point out 
that the review should draw from existing sectoral or 
regional review processes to limit additional reporting 
burdens. 
The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) stress that 
they need special support, not only for the review it-
self but also for the implementation of the recommen-
dations that come out of it. The G77 has advocated for 
the commitments of the donor countries to become 
a subject for the future review, an idea that is already 
set out in the resolution on the HLPF.29 There is no 
26  European Commission, A Decent Life for All: From Vision to 
Collective Action, COM (2014) 335 final (Brussels, June 2, 2014). 
27  See, e.g., their letter dated October 16 to the Secretary-
General (A/69/552). 
28  Elements on the issue ‘Review, monitoring and accountability’ 
for the post-2015 agenda on sustainable development, German Non-
Paper, November 2014. 
29  UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of HLPF (see note 8), 
para. 7d and 8: “Decides that the forum […] shall conduct regular 
reviews […] on the follow-up and implementation of sustain-
able development commitments and objectives, including those 
related to the means of implementation, within the context of the 
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agreement among donor countries on this point. 
However, given the significant role that the means of 
implementation played in the negotiations over the 
SDGs, it should be clear to them that a provision on 
this subject can hardly be avoided if the ultimate aim 
is to create a strong review. When states have mutual 
obligations to each other, which they have an interest 
in monitoring reciprocally, a window of opportunity 
for creating an effective review opens up. The newly 
industrializing countries want to monitor the indus-
trialized countries’ consumption and production pat-
terns, and vice versa. The G77 wants to monitor the 
fulfillment of financial commitments and the donor 
countries want to know whether the newly industrial-
ized countries are participating adequately in develop-
ment financing, whether the developing countries 
have exhausted their own resources, and to what ex-
tent good governance is ensuring the effective and 
efficient use of these resources. 
Beyond all these state interests with respect to the 
Post-2015 review, it is instructive to also analyze pre-
vious UN politics in the area of sustainable develop-
ment, and so to identify what past experiences should 
be considered in the design of the future Post-2015/ 
SDG follow-up mechanism. With regard to the MDGs, 
both experts and national representatives argue that 
the developing countries lacked political ownership since 
the targets were more or less imposed on them by 
the UN and the main donor countries.30 This must be 
avoided in the Post-2015 goals. Instead, political will 
and ambition should be fostered to drive the trans-
formation to sustainable development forward. This 
applies to both industrialized and newly industrial-
ized countries, as well as to the developing countries. 
In many of the LDCs, the capacities needed to support 
such an orientation are often lacking. In order for 
these countries to pursue sustainable development 
paths, they will need targeted support. This is true 
especially of fragile states, most of which have failed 
to achieve the MDGs.31 Moreover, corruption and 
clientelism have led regimes to pursue policies that 
post-2015 development agenda.” (Emphasis added) 
30  Nicole Rippin, Progress, Prospects and Lessons from the MDGs, 
Background Research Paper for the Report of the High Level 
Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (May 2013), 16. 
31  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind, Fact-
sheet on Resource Flows and Trends (Paris, 2013), http://www. 
oecd.org/dac/incaf/factsheet%202013%20resource%20flows% 
20final.pdf (accessed July 23, 2014). 
are more invested in short-term profits than in long-
term sustainability. 
Thus, past experiences show that the successful 
implementation of programs for sustainable develop-
ment depends either on the political will of decision 
makers and/or on the capacities of political systems and 
local service providers. States either have the desire 
and/or ability to implement targets—or they do not.32 
In the latter case, follow-up processes should be cre-
ated to provide both incentives and accountability 
mechanisms, and/or be accompanied by capacity-
building measures. Incentives might include the ex-
change of knowledge and experiences, information 
on best practices, and improved access to resources for 
implementation or advantageous partnerships. Peer 
pressure should be applied when commitments are 
not met despite available resources. Sanctions, how-
ever, are unrealistic and are also not wanted.33 In any 
case, the UN has almost no recourse to binding mecha-
nisms outside the areas of security and trade. Their 
most effective means are to foster transparency, open-
ness, and visibility in the international community, 
thereby creating the aforementioned peer pressure, 
and to involve experts or civil society actors from the 
UN and local level in the process. This is another 
reason for designing the process to be as participatory 
as possible. 
In this sense, the new review should do both: sup-
port and encourage implementation. Its first task would 
be to provide individualized support for implemen-
tation within a national framework. Its second task 
would be to monitor whether states have complied 
with their own commitments. 
In the past, a number of states had misgivings 
about stronger accountability mechanisms on the inter-
national level. Governments are accountable first 
and foremost to their own citizens, but they are also 
accountable to those who are affected by their actions 
beyond national boundaries. Both of these aspects 
should form the foundation for the future HLPF Review 
32  In the research on the question of when states do follow 
international rules, a combination of transparency, reporting 
requirements, dispute resolution mechanisms, and capacity 
building is discussed. Cf., e.g., Abram Chayes and Antonia 
Chayes, “On Compliance,” in: International Organization 47, 
no. 2 (1993): 175–205. 
33  The FAQ page of the HLPF website states: “The Forum will 
not have any enforcement mechanism to compel States to 
comply with its recommendations. Given the enormous scope 
of the global sustainable development agenda, implementa-
tion of its recommendations depends on the commitment of 
each country.” 
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process. In order to attain an adequate level of accept-
ance among the UN Member States and to bring the 
review process as close as possible to the local imple-
mentation level, it should respect national sovereignty 
as much as possible and also be structured in a sub-
sidiary way, as a multi-level process with strong in-
volvement at the national levels.34 In order to make 
sure that local as well as national levels are effectively 
reached, the review should be designed as a compre-
hensive, multi-level model that integrates the global 
community as well as local civil society and other 
stakeholders. The accountability component should 
not, however, be restricted solely to the national level, 
as parliaments and civil society organizations do not 
have sufficient policy space to hold governments 
accountable in all countries. An international review 
platform would help to strengthen the positions of 
these national actors.35 
The future HLPF review should also take a differen-
tiated approach, as called for by the outcome document 
of the Rio+20 Conference. Sustainable development 
goals should be “global in nature and universally 
applicable to all countries, while taking into account 
different national realities, capacities and levels of 
development and respecting national policies and 
priorities.”36 Up to now, however, it has not been 
determined what exact form this differentiation will 
take. Global negotiation on the different national 
goals or targets would place too great a burden on the 
process and would create major delays. In the follow-
ing, this paper explores how the principle of differen-
tiation could be incorporated into the review process 
by starting the review with national targets and com-
mitments set by the nations themselves in the areas 
of the Post-2015 goals, which are then assessed in an 
initial round of the review process. 
However, a differentiated approach relates not only 
to the guidelines but also to the means of implementa-
tion. This was a subject of vigorous debate during the 
negotiations of the SDG proposal in the OWG. Contro-
versy arose over the principle of Common but Differ-
entiated Responsibilities (CBDR) that had been adopted 
during the first Rio Conference in 1992.37 In this dis-
pute, the G77 insisted that the obligation emerging 
34  UN documents and discussions refer here to a “decentral-
ized” and “multi-layered” or “multi-tiered” approach. 
35  Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond 
Borders. Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, 1998). 
36  UNGA, The Future We Want (see note 1), para. 247, 47. 
37  Jens Martens, “Sharing Global Burdens”, D+C Development 
and Cooperation 12 (2014), 474. 
from this principle for industrialized countries to pro-
vide funding for implementation must be clarified 
before beginning to talk about monitoring or reporting 
mechanisms, because a mechanism would undoubted-
ly have to cover the fulfillment of such commitments. 
The G77 will only accept a strong HLFP review if the 
donor countries declare their willingness to participate 
in a corresponding review. 
To accommodate the growing diversity of stake-
holders, each with their own resources and skills in 
the field of sustainable development, the review should 
also be open to non-governmental initiatives and partner-
ships that want to make voluntary contributions to the 
implementation of Post-2015 goals. Correspondingly, 
the HLPF resolution calls for a “platform for partner-
ships” to be created in the framework of the review.38 
The review framework should support these initiatives 
and partnerships if they prove effective—and it should 
also help to identify failures. 
Finally, the process must be carried out within the 
framework and with the capabilities of the UN system 
and its members. This means taking into considera-
tion the limited financial as well as temporal resources 
of the various actors and institutions involved. Several 
Member States have spoken out in the past against 
additional “UN bureaucracy” and excessive reporting 
burdens. But behind this lies another trade-off: If the 
process is too lean, one cannot expect much to come 
out of it. 
 
The discussion up to this point leads to the following 
criteria that an effective review mechanism should ful-
fill: 
 
 Accepted by UN Member States? 
  Establishment and active use of the review* 
  Process is perceived as state-led 
 Includes incentives? 
  Mutual feedback and reassurance as well as 
shared learning experiences 
  Assistance with mobilizing means of 
implementation 
 Transparent and visible, with some degree of social 
control? 
  Degree of public access and public visibility 
  Elements of peer pressure in the context of a 
38  UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of the HLPF (see 
note 8), para. 8c: “Shall provide a platform for partnerships, 
including through the participation of major groups and 
other stakeholders.” 
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mutual review 
 Participatory? 
  Level of involvement from regional, national, 
and local civil society, UN Major Groups and 
other stakeholders 
  Open for voluntary initiatives and partnerships 
for sustainable development 
 Subsidiary and differentiated design? 
  Coherent bottom-up structure from the local, 
to the national, regional, and global levels 
  Differentiation by national priorities and 
capacities possible 
 Feasible? 
  Manageable organizational, time, and budgetary 
requirements 
  Building on findings from existing reviews 
 Effective?* 
  Successful improvement of national 
implementation (output, outcome, impact) 
(* only for the analysis of existing reviews) 
 
These criteria can be used to analyze existing review 
processes and evaluate their advantages for the new 
Post-2015 review. The proposed design for this review 
is also based on them. The intention here is not solely 
to identify an ideal review process, but to explore dif-
ferent elements and review process variants in order 
to show the options available for dealing with the 
reservations and potential trade-offs identified above. 
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How do existing review models fare when evaluated 
against the outlined criteria? What “best practices” 
can be identified to inspire the design of the HLPF 
mechanism to review the implementation of sustain-
able development? Since many experts and states 
favor a multi-level approach for the new mechanism, 
international, regional, and national review processes 
are relevant to consider. Their work and findings 
could also be incorporated into the preparation of 
the review at the global level. 
The Annual Ministerial Review and other 
Reviews in the UN Development System 
At the UN level, the Annual Ministerial Review (AMR) 
under the ECOSOC is of particular interest since the 
HLPF Review is to build on this process and replace it 
as of 2016.39 The AMR was mandated at the 2005 World 
Summit to conduct a ministerial-level review to assess 
progress towards the MDGs and to evaluate and review 
implementation of the UN Development Agenda.40 
The AMR was further strengthened and raised in 
status in early 2007. Since then, the review has taken 
place on a different thematic focus each year (patterned 
on ECOSOC’s annual theme).41 It is held within the 
framework of the ECOSOC High-Level Segment, with 
organizational and preparatory work being carried 
out by the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (UNDESA). The AMR has three main 
elements on three levels: 
The core element of the AMR is National Voluntary 
Presentations (NVPs). Each year, approximately ten 
39  United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Format and 
Organizational Aspects of the HLPF (see note 8), para. 7a: “build-
ing on and subsequently replacing the annual ministerial 
review as from 2016.” See also para. 8d: “Shall replace the 
national voluntary presentations held in the context of the 
annual ministerial-level substantive reviews of the Council, 
building upon the relevant provisions of General Assembly 
resolution 61/16 of November 20, 2006, as well as experiences 
and lessons learned in this context.” 
40  UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN-Doc. A/Res/60/1 
(New York, October 24, 2005), para. 155c, p. 33. 
41  UNGA, Strengthening of the Economic and Social Council, 
UN-Doc. A/Res/61/16 (New York, January 9, 2007), para. 8. 
states make voluntary presentations on their successes 
and challenges in implementing selected development 
goals. Each of these states submits a national report 
by April and presents key elements of the report during 
the ECOSOC High-Level Segment in July (20-minute 
presentation followed by a 40-minute discussion). In 
the past, it was sometimes difficult to motivate states 
to participate. In addition, the presentations have 
occasionally been criticized as relatively unproductive. 
One issue is that the state making the presentation 
selects the three states reviewing its NVP itself—making 
it very likely that states will choose reviewers that 
tend to be favorably disposed toward them. A second 
issue is that the presentations themselves have often 
failed to seriously address the real problems and chal-
lenges states face in the process of implementation. 
The guidelines for the 2014 AMR now call upon the 
participating states to also discuss challenges and 
obstacles.42 The outcomes and positive examples are 
presented on the website “Development Strategies 
that Work.”43 
In addition, ECOSOC supports country-led regional 
reviews.De facto, these are regional consultation pro-
cesses that are designed to prepare the way for the 
global High-Level Segment. While this is supposed 
to provide for a bottom-up structure, there have been 
clear problems in implementation in the past. Accord-
ingly, a report of the UN Secretary-General recom-
mends strengthening the regional dimension and 
integrating it better with the global level review.44 
This integration is even more necessary for the national 
consultation and review processes that—according to 
the recent UN Secretary-General’s synthesis report—
the states should use in the future to make the overall 
42  UNDESA, Guidance Note for the 2014 National Voluntary Presen-
tations, New York: Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordina-
tion Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United 
Nations, November 2013. 
43  See http://webapps01.un.org/nvp/home.action (accessed 
July 28, 2014). 
44  ECOSOC, The Contribution of ECOSOC to the Elaboration of the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda as a Principal Body for Policy Review, 
Policy Dialogue and Recommendations on Issues of Economic and 
Social Development and for the Follow-up to the MDGs, UN-Doc. E/ 
2013/72; Report of the Secretary-General (New York, May 10, 
2013), para. 21. 
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process more bottom-up, transparent, and partici-
patory. 
As the third element in the AMR process, the Secre-
tary-General presents a report with a review of global 
progress on the UN Development Agenda. The final 
outcome of the AMR is the Ministerial Declaration, which 
is adopted in the ECOSOC High-Level Segment. 
There are several positive and valuable aspects of 
the AMR that offer points of departure for the HLPF 
Review process—yet there is a significant need for 
improvement in terms of concrete implementation.45 
The main criticisms of the AMR are its lack of incen-
tives for UN Member States to participate in a serious 
way, and up to now the complete absence of follow-up 
on the review and its recommendations. Also, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are only allowed 
to participate to a limited extent within the frame-
work of the relatively restrictive ECOSOC rules.46 
 
The AMR is supplemented by the Development Cooper-
ation Forum (DCF), which was also introduced in 2005. 
The DCF is not explicitly a review procedure, but 
nevertheless serves in reviewing trends, progress, and 
gaps in the implementation of international develop-
ment goals.47 The outcome of the two-day symposium 
of the DCF during the ECOSOC High-Level Segment in 
July is the President’s Summary. The biennial DCF is 
open to all stakeholders, including the UN and regional 
organizations as well as international financial insti-
tutions, parliamentarians and local government rep-
resentatives, and representatives of civil society and 
private sector organizations. In the process of prepa-
rations, various formats are combined—high-level 
meetings with more analytical working groups as well 
as stakeholder consultations. In March 2014 in Berlin, 
45  UNDESA, Summary. UNDESA Training Workshop and Expert 
Group Meeting in Preparation for the 2014 Annual Ministerial Review 
of the UN ECOSOC (New York, February 2014). 
46  Jan-Gustav Strandenaes, Participatory Democracy—HLPF Laying 
the Basis for Sustainable Development Governance in the 21st Century. 
Modalities for Major Groups, Non-Governmental Organisations and 
other Stakeholders Engagement with the High Level Political Forum 
on Sustainable Development (New York: UNDESA, March 2014). 
47  The DCF “should review trends and progress in inter-
national development cooperation […]; identify gaps and 
obstacles with a view to making recommendations […] for the 
realization of the internationally agreed development goals, 
including the Millennium Development Goals,” see UNGA, 
Strengthening of the Economic and Social Council (see note 41), 
para. 4. In concrete terms, developments are tracked along 
ten indicators that were defined in 2011 at the Fourth High-
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. 
a high-level symposium in preparation for the DCF 
was held focusing on the problem of “Accountable 
and Effective Development Cooperation in a Post-2015 
Era.”48 The conclusions of the symposium underscored 
that the DCF sees itself as a “global apex body for 
accountability” in matters of effective development 
cooperation and the global partnership for develop-
ment of the Post-2015 Development Agenda.49 
Yet there is some debate over whether the DCF 
should be the key institution for monitoring and evalu-
ating the Post-2015 agenda and sustainable develop-
ment goals. The DCF’s mandate is very limited on the 
question of effective development cooperation. More-
over, there are other competing institutions working 
in this field, such as the new Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation, which is sup-
posed to carry out monitoring tasks in this area as 
well,50 the OECD-DAC (see p. 19), and now also the 
HLPF. 
In the past, the DCF has often addressed cross-
cutting issues such as South-South Cooperation and 
the aforementioned questions of mutual account-
ability. A special focus of its work has also been on the 
coherence of the UN system’s efforts on development 
issues. 
This is also the focus of the Quadrennial Comprehen-
sive Policy Review (QCPR).51 Introduced in 2008 and 
strengthened further in 2012, this procedure is used 
by the General Assembly to measure and improve the 
effectiveness and coherence of the UN development 
system. To this end, detailed results frameworks have 
been developed to accompany the strategic plans of 
the UN programs and funds and to be used as tools for 
48  See also the background study for the 2014 DCF by José 
Antonio Ocampo and Natalia Gómez Arteaga, Accountable and 
Effective Development Cooperation in a Post-2015 Era (New York, 
March 2014), http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf13/ 
dcf_germany_bkgd_study_3_global_accountability.pdf 
(accessed July 27, 2014). 
49  Development Cooperation Policy Branch (Office for 
ECOSOC Support and Coordination, UNDESA), 2014 DCF Sup-
port Strategy: Preparations for the Development Cooperation Forum, 
Phase IV: 2012–2014 (January 2013), 6 (“global apex body for 
accountability”). 
50  See also Heiner Janus, Stephan Klingebiel, and Timo 
Mahn, How to Shape Development Cooperation? The Global Partner-
ship and the Development Cooperation Forum, DIE Briefing Paper 
3/2014 (Bonn: German Development Institute [DIE], 2014). 
51  See Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination, 
UNDESA, 2012–2016 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review 
(QCPR) of the General Assembly of UN Operational Activities for 
Development (online), http://www.un.org/en/development/ 
desa/oesc/qcpr.shtml (accessed July 27, 2014). 
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evaluating their output. Some praise this approach as 
potentially revolutionary,52 while others criticize it 
as relatively ineffectual additional bureaucracy. The 
current QCPR cycle ends in 2016. The question remains 
open whether and to what extent the QCPR can be 
linked to the new HLPF Review in the future to inte-
grate all of the relevant UN entities in the review 
process, as stipulated in the resolution on the HLPF.53 
The Secretary-General’s 2012 QCPR Report emphasizes 
that results-oriented, innovative management, and 
corresponding evaluation procedures need to be better 
coordinated throughout the entire UN system.54 This 
is also an important precondition and objective for 
the HLPF Review. In this spirit, Deputy UN Secretary-
General Jan Eliasson views the QCPR as an important 
means of preparing the UN for the Post-2015 agenda, 
making the UN “fit for purpose”. 
The Universal Periodic Review in the 
area of Human Rights 
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the Human 
Rights Council (HRC) examines and assesses the 
human rights situation in all UN member states. The 
UPR is considered by many experts to be a model for 
the new HLPF Review.55 
The UPR does indeed offer a number of interesting 
ideas for process and structural features that could 
52  Pio Wennubst and Timo Mahn, A Resolution for a Quiet 
Revolution. Taking the United Nations to Sustainable Development 
“Beyond Aid”, DIE Discussion Paper 22/2013 (Bonn and New 
York: DIE, 2013). 
53  UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of the HLPF (see 
note 8), para. 8a. “shall include […] relevant United Nations 
entities.” 
54  UNGA, Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational 
Activities for Development of the United Nations System, UN-Doc. 
A/67/93 (New York, June 2012). 
55  Jens Martens, Globale Nachhaltigkeitsziele für die Post-2015-
Entwicklungsagenda (Bonn and Osnabrück: Global Policy 
Forum Europe/Terre des Hommes, January 2013), http://www. 
globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPFEurope/Report_Globale_ 
Nachhaltigkeitsziele_Online.pdf; Steven Bernstein, The Role 
and Place of the High-Level Political Forum in Strengthening the 
Global Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development, Paper 
for UNDESA (September 2013), http://sustainabledevelopment. 
un.org/content/documents/2331Bernstein%20study%20on%20
HLPF.pdf (both accessed September 29, 2014); see also: Special 
Procedures Mandate-Holders of the Human Rights Council, 
If Rio+20 Is to Deliver, Accountability Must Be at Its Heart, Open Letter, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/OpenLetterRio20. 
aspx (accessed July 22, 2014). 
be utilized in the future HLPF Review. First, the UPR is 
designed as both universal and periodic. The UPR reviews 
the human right situation of all UN Member States 
once every 4.5 years, that is, 42 states are asked to re-
port each year (first the HRC members in three Work-
ing Group sessions of two weeks each). Participation in 
the UPR is compulsory, but its recommendations are 
not binding. There are no sanctions in place for states 
that refuse to participate. In cases of “persistent-non-
cooperation,” the Human Rights Council decides on 
an individual basis what measures to take.56 Like the 
UPR, the HLPF also has universal membership, but its 
review is defined explicitly as a voluntary mechanism. 
It could nevertheless clearly state that all states are 
encouraged and expected to participate regularly in 
the review. 
The UPR is coordinated by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva. 
The UPR review procedure is more complex than that 
of the AMR and has been developed further over time.57 
Here, too, each state under review (SuR) first sub-
mits a national report (20 pages maximum). The SuR is 
expected to have carried out civil society consultations 
at the national level prior to the review. The state’s 
reports are then supplemented by a compilation of 
information from UN bodies (10 pages maximum) 
including observations, comments, and recommen-
dations of the responsible UN treaty bodies, that is, 
the UN committees that monitor implementation of 
the core international human rights treaties and the 
UN Special Rapporteurs. The compilation is prepared 
by the office of the OHCHR. 
NGOs and other non-governmental observers are 
also asked to submit their own assessments to the 
process (five pages maximum). As such, these are not 
merely “shadow reports” but create an independent 
basis for the review. All of the reports from civil 
society are then compiled by the High Commissioner 
into a “Summary of stakeholders’ information” (10 
56  For instance in 2013, see: UNGA, Report of the Human Rights 
Council on its Seventh Organizational Meeting, UN-Doc. A/HRC/OM/ 
7/1 (New York, April 2013). 
57  Theodor Rathgeber, The HRC Universal Periodic Review: A Pre-
liminary Assessment, FES Briefing Paper 6 (Geneva: Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation, July 2008). Tiffany Henderson, Towards Im-
plementation: An Analysis of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism 
of the Human Rights Council (n.p., n.d.; probably from 2008), 
http://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/ 
pdf/-towards_implementation_by_tiffany_henderson.pdf 
(accessed July 29, 2014). On the process, see also the informa-
tion on the website of the NGO UPR Info http://www.upr-info. 
org/-UPR-Process-.html (accessed July 23, 2014). 
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pages maximum), which is then presented to the HRC. 
All documents submitted are also published on the 
OHCHR’s website for the UPR. Member State represen-
tatives may then address the NGOs’ information in 
their own comments and recommendations during 
the review.58 
During the public presentation by the SuR (70 min-
utes) and interactive dialogue (140 minutes), only the 
Member States are allowed to speak (2–3 minutes each) 
but not the participating NGOs. The SuR can choose 
whether or not they want to respond to questions or 
comments. The members of the HRC and representa-
tives of the states under review take part in the dia-
logue; further UN Member States can also be present 
as observers. The public is able to follow the process 
on live UN webcast. 
After the dialogue, the troika—three states from 
different regional groups selected (in contrast to the 
AMR) by the drawing of lots from among the Member 
States to serve as both facilitator and rapporteur—
compiles an approximately 30-page outcome report 
that provides a summary of the discussion and a full 
list of recommendations made by states.59 In the past, 
the number of recommendations was between 20 
and 200. The SuR is then expected to provide written 
comment on each of these recommendations within 
a specified period. It can either accept or reject the 
recommendations, and can also list further voluntary 
measures. The SuR is expected to implement the 
recommendations it has accepted as well as its volun-
tary commitments by the next periodic review. 
The HRC officially adopts the report, together with 
all responses by the SuR, at its next session. During the 
one-hour discussion of the report in the plenary of 
the HRC, accredited non-governmental observers again 
have the right to speak and can make comments on 
the results.60 
In the next cycle, the follow-up takes place. Here, 
the focus is on changes that have been made since the 
last round, and on the implementation of recommen-
dations. States can also send the HRC a voluntary “Mid-
Term Report” on steps taken towards implementation. 
The UPR process is of particular interest because of 
the broad acceptance it has achieved despite including 
obligatory elements and also involving intense partici-
58  Henderson, Towards Implementation (see note 57), 21, 24f. 
59  Human Rights Council, Modalities and Practices for the Uni-
versal Periodic Review Process, UN-Doc. 8/PRST/1 (April 2008). 
60  Planned are 20 minutes for the country presenting, 20 
minutes for the other Member States, and 20 minutes for 
accredited non-governmental observers. 
pation by experts and NGOs at several points in the 
process. It is designed to be highly transparent and 
participatory, yet it is also state-led and respects the 
dominant position of Member States in the UN. Par-
ticipation is high despite the lack of material incen-
tives and the relatively large amount of effort required. 
A Voluntary Fund for Financial and Technical Assis-
tance has been set up to provide developing countries 
with assistance in following up on the recommenda-
tions. The UPR has a relatively narrow thematic focus 
on the human rights situation of countries, based on 
fairly specific provisions of international human rights 
legislation on which there is broad consensus. These 
features distinguish the UPR process from the future 
Post-2015 Review. 
Further sectoral, regional, and 
national reviews 
There are a number of further reviews with a sectoral 
focus, whose innovative elements are of interest for 
the HLPF mechanism.61 The Pledge and Review process 
established under the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) asks states to 
formulate their own pledges with regard to climate 
mitigation (now called Intended Nationally Deter-
mined Contributions, INDCs). When it was created, 
the subsequent review process still had not been 
fleshed out in detail, so it at least tried to achieve 
transparency by publishing the national pledges.62 In 
the meantime, the review process (MRV: Monitoring, 
Reporting, and Verification) has become binding for 
the Annex I Parties to the Convention—that is, for 
most of the industrialized countries. For the Non-
Annex I Parties (newly industrialized and developing 
countries), it is voluntary or limited to national-level 
review measures, except in the case of internationally 
financed mitigation efforts, which are monitored 
internationally as well.63 
61  See also UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
Secretariat, Lessons from the Peer Review Mechanism, Rio 2012 
Issues Brief No. 2 (July 2011); Mark Halle, Adil Najam, and 
Robert Wolfe, Building an Effective Review Mechanism: Lessons for 
the HLPF (Winnipeg: The International Institute for Sustain-
able Development, February 2014). 
62  David King, Kenneth Richards, and Sally Tyldesley, Inter-
national Climate Change Negotiations: Key Lessons and Next Steps 
(Oxford: Smith School of Enterprise and Environment, July 
2011), 21f. 
63  Daniel Bodansky, “The Copenhagen Climate Change Con-
ference: A Post Mortem,” The American Journal of International 
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Further sectoral, regional, and national reviews 
In this process, the UNFCCC secretariat produces a 
comprehensive report evaluating the extent to which 
the submitted national voluntary pledges are suffi-
cient to meet the internationally agreed target of 
limiting global warming to two degrees Celsius. Expert 
Review Teams (ERTs) examine whether the Annex I 
countries have fulfilled their mitigation pledges based 
on their evaluation of the submitted national reports 
as well as field visits. Over 120 experts from 
industrialized and developing countries are involved 
in these teams each year. 
An advantage of this Pledge and Review process is 
that also countries that were previously unwilling 
to enter into binding commitments in intergovern-
mental negotiations under the UNFCCC could be moti-
vated to submit voluntary commitments. As a result, 
more than 85 percent of global emissions are now 
covered. At the same time, reports by the UNFCCC 
secretariat and estimates by NGOs suggest that the 
national mitigation commitments that have been 
made up to this point are nowhere close to sufficient 
in order to keep the global temperature below the two 
degree Celsius “guardrail”. This has undermined the 
legitimacy of the approach and has also brought cri-
tique from numerous national representatives.64 It is 
currently under discussion how the review could be 
expanded at the Conference of the Parties on Climate 
Change in Paris in 2015—in combination with a broader 
Post-2015 review. Here, questions of equity and justice 
have been raised in particular—an aspect that is likely 
to be decisive in the HLPF Review as well.65 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) conducts several different kinds 
of peer reviews. Most of these are voluntary; only a 
few are legally binding, such as the monitoring of the 
Law 104, no. 2 (April 2010): 230–40. For the current state, see 
the website of the UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/ 
items/7173.php (accessed July 27, 2014). 
64  Katarina Buhr, Susanna Roth, and Peter Stigson, “Climate 
Change Politics through a Global Pledge-and-Review Regime: 
Positions among Negotiators and Stakeholders,” Sustainability, 
no. 6 (2014): 794–811. 
65  Bert Metz, Making a Pledge and Review System Work: National 
Green Growth Plans, Policies and a Different Approach to Equity 
(online), (December 2013), http://controllingclimatechange. 
net/making-a-pledge-and-review-system-work (accessed Sep-
tember 29, 2014); Thomas Hale and Max Harris, Country-to-
Country Review under the Next Climate Treaty. Lessons from Other 
Intergovernmental Review Processes, BSG Policy memo (Oxford: 
University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Government, Feb-
ruary 24, 2014). 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.66 The Peer Review of 
the OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) is 
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of development 
cooperation by donor countries. It focuses in particu-
lar on working processes and procedures in this policy 
area. The OECD uses review teams comprised of repre-
sentatives of both Member States and of the DAC sec-
retariat. Input from recipient countries is also taken 
into account. A unique feature of the OECD-DAC Peer 
Review is that the implementation of recommenda-
tions is reviewed after two years at the latest in a “Mid-
Term Review” as well as in the next periodic review.67 
Expert teams also play a part in the OECD’S Environ-
mental Performance Reviews, which focus on specific poli-
cies.68 Both review processes involve field visits, con-
sulting also with civil society representatives. Reports 
are discussed first internally and then among a broader 
circle. The OECD secretariat plays a key role in the en-
tire process. It drafts the initial version of the report. 
The OECD Peer Reviews have been assessed quite 
positively in the research literature. They are generally 
considered to be of very high quality; their results are 
seen as valuable. Most importantly, the recommenda-
tions they produce are implemented to a relatively sig-
nificant degree. Even states that are not members of 
the OECD have voluntarily taken part in a number 
of OECD Peer Reviews. However, due to the complex 
procedures involved, this type of review is extremely 
expensive. In the international context, this restricts 
its relevance as a model for the Post-2015 review. 
 
There are also regional-level reviews whose work could 
be integrated usefully into a multi-level model for 
a Post-2015 review.69 In 2003, the African Peer Review 
66  For a comprehensive overview and very positive assess-
ment of the OECD Peer Review, see Fabrizio Pagani, Peer 
Review: A Tool for Cooperation and Change. An Analysis of an OECD 
Working Method (Paris: OECD General Secretariat Directorate 
for Legal Affairs, September 2002; and in African Security Review 
11, no. 4 [2002]: 15–24). 
67  Guido Ashoff, 50 Years of Peer Reviews by the OECD’s Develop-
ment Assistance Committee: an Instrument of Quality Assurance and 
Mutual Learning, DIE Briefing Paper 12/2013 (Bonn: DIE, 2013). 
68  The G20 also relies on voluntary peer reviews in this area, 
e.g., to reduce subsidies for fossil fuel energy sources, see 
Ivetta Gerasimchuk, Mapping Options for a Voluntary Peer Review 
of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform within the G-20 (Winnipeg/Geneva: 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, July 
2013). 
69  The EU also has extensive experience with review pro-
cesses—in the area of social development, e.g., with the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC). Member States should compare 
their efforts and exchange experiences. 
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Mechanism (APRM) was established by the African Union 
(AU) as part of the New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment (NEPAD).70 The APRM is conceived as a 
mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring 
national action plans. So far, seventeen countries have 
participated. The thematic focus of the review is on 
democracy and political governance, economic 
governance and management, corporate governance, 
and socio-economic development. Information on 
these areas is collected using a list of indicators and a 
questionnaire. The APRM Secretariat produces a 
background study based on a range of data and 
findings. The APRM also sends expert teams to 
conduct Country Review Visits. The process takes into 
account information from a variety of sources: 
national and local government actors, 
parliamentarians, civil society and private sector 
actors, academia and also external experts such as the 
OECD-DAC and the African Development Bank. 
However, the involvement of civil society actors as 
part of the field visits has frequently been described 
as needing improvement.71 At the end, a National 
Programme of Action (NPoA) is prepared with short-
term, medium-term, and long-term goals that are 
monitored, reported on, and discussed in the sub-
sequent review. The Country Review Reports are first 
discussed internally among the states before being 
released publicly. 
This is overall an extremely intensive and time-con-
suming process that requires a certain level of capa-
bilities on the part of both the NEPAD secretariat and 
the institutions in the participating countries. In the 
past, various UN organizations and also Germany have 
supported capacity-building in these institutions.72 
Observers have also emphasized that the secretariat 
70  A comprehensive description and (positive) evaluation of 
the APRM is provided by Kempe Ronald Hope, “Toward Good 
Governance and Sustainable Development: The African Peer 
Review Mechanism,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions 18, no. 2 (April 2005): 283–311. 
Ian Taylor is much more skeptical in “Of Big Men and Big 
Ideas: Can NEPAD’s APRM Make a Difference?” in Inside Africa: 
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. A. S. Yaruingam and Rashmi 
Kapoor (Delhi, 2013), 3–20. 
71  Ravi Kanbur, “The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): 
An Assessment of Concept and Design,” South African Journal of 
Political Studies 31, no. 2 (2004): 157–66. 
72  The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (BMZ), Regionale Kooperation in Afrika. Der entwicklung-
spolitische Beitrag Deutschlands, BMZ Informationsbroschüre 
7/2011 (Bonn and Berlin, 2011), 14. 
and the review teams must be kept independent and 
protected from political manipulation. 
A unique feature of the APRM is the close involve-
ment of the participating heads of state and govern-
ment, who hold ultimate responsibility for oversight 
of the review process in the Heads of State Forum. 
They have to be present personally at various points 
in the multi-level process and cannot send represen-
tatives in their place. The intention of creating this 
structure was to strengthen the political self-commit-
ment by ruling elites and to provide for incentives for 
domestic reforms. So far, this has only been successful 
to a limited extent.73 
 
Finally, a few countries are using national review pro-
cedures as part of their sustainability politics. The 
German Council for Sustainable Development (RNE), which 
is appointed by the federal government, conducted its 
second international Peer Review of German sustain-
ability policy in 2013. The process, which is scheduled 
to take place every four years, is based on the German 
National Sustainability Strategy, the Federal Statisti-
cal Office’s Indicator Report, and the federal govern-
ment’s Progress Report. The recommendations that 
emerge from the review go to the Federal State Secre-
taries’ Committee for Sustainable Development, which 
is presided over by the Federal Chancellery and has 
the task of continually developing and updating the 
National Sustainability Strategy. In the 2013 report, 
a group of international experts recommend that the 
Committee should already begin revising the German 
sustainability strategy in 2014 and not merely see this 
as “just another routine iteration.”74 Furthermore, 
they urge that the Committee work toward this end 
in a more cooperative way than it has up to now. Ger-
many should aim at “smart sovereignty”, combining 
the active pursuit of its national agenda with a global 
leadership role by providing solutions for a sustain-
able future. 
Already at the 1992 UN Conference in Rio it was 
recommended that all countries develop their national 
sustainability strategies. This call was repeated at the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg (see also p. 7). If national sustainable 
73  Markus Beckmann, NePAD und der African Peer Review Mecha-
nism – Zum Potential politischer Selbstbindung, Diskussionspapier 
No. 8/2007, ed. Ingo Pies (Halle: Martin-Luther-Universität 
Halle-Wittenberg, Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik, 2007). 
74  RNE, Sustainability—Made in Germany. The Second Review by a 
Group of International Peers, commissioned by the German Federal 
Chancellery (Berlin, September 2013), 28f., 43. 
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development strategies were now aligned with the 
Post-2015 agenda and sustainable development goals, 
they could, in the future, form the foundation for the 
review process described here. Independent sustain-
able development councils or similar bodies could 
coordinate national consultation and discussion pro-
cesses on the national strategies and reports.75 Further-
more, these bodies could organize peer reviews at the 
national level as a means to identify critical points (in 
the implementation) of national strategies for sustain-
able development. 
Lessons learned 
Review procedures should create transparency, foster 
learning effects, encourage accountability, strengthen 
political will, and promote capacity building. Existing 
review processes on the national, regional, and global 
level offer a number of promising features. These could 
be used, first, in the design of the future HLPF Review. 
Second, they could themselves be integrated into a 
multi-tiered review process. 
Most of the procedures discussed up to now use dif-
ferent forms of input as the basis for a periodic review. 
Most of these consist of national reports combined 
with other supplementary information. The degree to 
which these procedures consider non-governmental 
actors and information provided by them varies. Some 
use review teams exclusively comprised of state repre-
sentatives who ask questions and provide comments, 
either within review bodies or in the context of field 
visits. This may be because countries reject the idea of 
including non-governmental experts in review teams 
(as is done in the OECD Peer Reviews).76 In some 
reviews, however, the procedures are based largely on 
expert reports.77 
75  Ingeborg Niestroy, Sustainable Development Councils at National 
and Sub-national Levels Stimulating Informed Debate: Stocktaking, 
SDG 2012 Think Pieces (London: Stakeholder Forum, 2012). 
76  There also have been disputes over this, see Matti Joutsen 
and Adam Graycar, “When Experts and Diplomats Agree: 
Negotiating Peer Review of the UN Convention Against Cor-
ruption,” Global Governance 18, no. 4 (2012): 425–39 (434). 
77  For example, with the Independent Reporting Mechanism 
of the Open Government Partnership, where progress reports 
are written by an expert under the oversight of an Inter-
national Experts’ Panel, see http://www.opengovpartnership. 
org/independent-reporting-mechanism (accessed July 27, 2014). 
The voluntary Peer Review on Energy Efficiency (PREE) of the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) also includes various 
non-governmental actors and experts in a review team as well 
To what extent civil society or other social actors and 
stakeholders should be involved in the development 
and discussion of reports at the national level is an-
other subject of debate among the UN Member States. 
Often, review processes call for this form of partici-
pation but do not specify the extent and quality of 
such national consultations. In some countries, 
national sustainability councils carry out this task in 
different forms.78 If the aim is to influence the political 
will of the governing elites, it makes sense to not only 
involve them directly in the review (as is the case with 
the APRM), but also to use the review process as a 
means of empowering the citizens to whom national 
decision-makers are accountable (local empowerment). 
For this reason, national sustainable development 
goals and reports should also be decided on by national 
parliaments. And not only diplomats should take part 
in the national voluntary presentations to the UN in 
New York but also elected politicians and high-level 
national government officials from the capitals. 
Local visits by review teams are widely considered to 
be effective, but are expensive and are sometimes re-
jected for reasons of national sovereignty or accepted 
only as a voluntary element of review processes.79 
Having to rely solely on national reports and desk 
studies, however, is a disadvantage. For any review, it 
is essential to address local conditions in depth and to 
determine whether there is sufficient support for effec-
tive implementation.80 This in itself—the collection of 
such information on the national and local situation—
could already be regarded as a successful outcome of a 
review process. 
One key question is to what extent states—and (as 
in the case of the APRM) heads of state—are willing to 
accept an open and also critical evaluation and the 
related peer pressure in the review process. In view 
of this, the various components of a review process 
should be weighed carefully against one another. 
Transparency, visibility, and broad participation are 
indeed critical factors in generating political will. At 
as through interviews carried out at the local level. 
78  The existing National Councils for Sustainable Develop-
ment (NCSD) are organized in the “Global Network of Nation-
al Councils for Sustainable Development and Similar Bodies,” 
see: http://www.ncsds.org (accessed July 23, 2014). 
79  The latter, e.g., in the review mechanism of the UN Con-
vention against Corruption. 
80  See also Martin Lodge, “The Importance of Being Modern: 
International Benchmarking and National Regulatory Inno-
vation,” Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 4 (August 2005): 
649–67. 
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the same time, the participating states should be able 
to initially explore and discuss the results of the review 
in a safe space. Often, final reports and recommenda-
tions are discussed first internally, with the respective 
decision-makers being given the opportunity to com-
ment on them. Then, these statements are incorpo-
rated into a report, at which point they can be dis-
cussed publicly. Ideally, the following open discussion 
on the report should be publicly accessible by webcast. 
During this public phase of the review process, it is 
crucial to again involve civil society actors and other 
stakeholders so that critical issues can be addressed. 
For this, review processes should not only be designed 
in a participatory manner, but governments must also 
provide for corresponding freedoms on the national 
level.81 
The evaluation of existing review mechanisms illus-
trates the relevance of a regular periodic follow-up to 
determine at an early stage the extent to which recom-
mendations are being implemented (as is done with 
the UPR or the OECD-DAC Review).82 Ideally, such a 
periodic review would pick up momentum over time, 
with states mutually encouraging one another’s pro-
gress in an iterative process. 
There are also several problems that have become 
evident. In general, few solutions have been found for 
dealing with states that do not want to participate in 
voluntary review processes. In addition, review pro-
cesses may be undermined when states do not report 
in sufficiently concrete terms or when the questions 
posed in the review are not specific or critical enough.83 
A standardized template for reporting and presenta-
tion could help by formulating explicit questions 
relating to potential challenges and gaps. A culture 
of defensive or formal and ritualized discussion, too, 
is not productive in achieving the aims of a review. 
Moreover, likeminded states may tend to protect each 
other in the review process; this occurs especially 
when they are allowed to choose their own reviewers. 
At the same time, there is a danger that review pro-
cesses will be captured for extraneous political 
81  Thomas Conzelmann, “Reporting and Peer Review in the 
Implementation of International Decisions: What Role for 
Civil Society?”, in The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-govern-
mental Actors, ed. Bob Reinalda (Aldershot, 2011), 319–31. 
82  The reports of the UN Secretary-General emphasize the 
importance of such “follow-up and report back mechanisms”, 
see, e.g., ECOSOC, The Contribution of ECOSOC (see note 44), 
para. 63. 
83  On the case of UPR, this is reported by Henderson, Towards 
Implementation (see note 57), 10, 16ff. 
purposes,84 for example, when they are affected by 
conflicts in other areas.85 
The secretariats play a key role in many of the reviews 
evaluated above: their work has a decisive influence 
on the quality of these reviews. Almost every publi-
cation on the subject quoted in this study emphasizes 
that secretariats’ work in preparing and supporting 
review processes is indispensible for an effective and 
efficient review. In some cases, secretariats carry out 
important substantive review tasks—for example, pro-
ducing background studies or even the reports them-
selves.86 In cases where the review has to be adopted 
by consensus, the secretariat also plays an important 
role as a facilitator and mediator.87 All this implies 
that secretariats should be independent, well equipped, 
and staffed with capable personnel. Often, however, 
they are de facto underfinanced. 
In the debate over the HLPF Review up to now, there 
has been a strong interest expressed in preventing 
duplication of existing sectoral and regional reporting 
and review processes. It would be advisable to pay 
heed to this in order to prevent the reporting burden 
from becoming excessive. Nevertheless, it remains 
unclear how the findings of existing processes can be 
incorporated into the HLPF Review. A first step would 
certainly be to compare the guidelines for the differ-
ent review processes that already exist in the UN 
framework. Indicators should be selected and the 
required data should be collected in such a way that 
they can be used for different reports and review 
processes. 
An essential foundation for meaningful and reliable 
monitoring, reporting, and review procedures is high-
84  See the debate in Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, “The Uni-
versal Periodic Review—Is there Life beyond Naming and 
Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?”, New Zealand 
Law Review, no. 4 (2012): 673–706. 
85  In the past, the Middle East conflict, e.g., has repeatedly 
complicated or altogether blocked UN negotiations in the 
area of sustainability. At the HLPF in July 2014, e.g., the inten-
sifying Gaza conflict made consensus on the Final Declara-
tion very difficult to reach. 
86  For example, with the Trade Reviews of the World Trade 
Association or, in the case of the OECD Economic Review, 
Robert Wolfe, Letting the Sun Shine in at the WTO: How Trans-
parency Brings the Trading System to Life, Working Paper ERSD 
3/2013 (Geneva: WTO, 2013), 13. Thomas Conzelmann, “Beyond 
the Carrot and the Stick: State Reporting Procedures in the 
WTO and the OECD”, in International Organizations and Policy 
Implementation, ed. Jutta Joachim, Bob Reinalda and Bertjan 
Verbeek (London 2008), 35–47. 
87  See Joutsen and Graycar, Negotiating Peer Review (see note 
76), 436f. 
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quality data on the goals and indicators of sustainable 
development. A precondition, however, for this is the 
ubiquitously invoked “data revolution.”88 Although 
data collection and preparation for monitoring pro-
cesses surrounding the MDGs have significantly im-
proved, these capacities need to be developed further, 
especially in developing countries. For statistical data 
to be useful in addressing the differentiated design of 
the Post-2015 goals, they need to be prepared not only 
for national and budget statistics, but also to investi-
gate aspects of distribution and justice or to identify 
effects on different disadvantaged groups. In August 
2014, the UN Secretary-General responded to this 
desideratum by convening a 24-member Independent 
Expert Advisory Group (IEAG) on a Data Revolution for 
Sustainable Development, which submitted its report 
with recommendations in November 2014.89 
 
 
88  OECD, Strengthening National Statistical Systems to Monitor 
Global Goals, OECD and Post-2015 Reflections, Element 5, 
Paper 1 (Paris, 2013); the OECD created the PARIS21 Partnership 
in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century. 
89  IEAG, “A World That Counts: Mobilising the Data Revolution for 
Sustainable Development,” Report prepared at the request of the 
United Nations Secretary-General by the Independent Expert 
Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Develop-
ment (New York, 2014). 
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 Proposal for a “Commit and Review” Process for 
the Post-2015 SDGs 
 
Based on the aforementioned criteria and analysis of 
existing review processes, this paper proposes a “Com-
mit and Review” process that would: 
 on the one hand, give states sovereign control over 
the national commitments they enter into (to build 
the necessary consensus for a state-led process and 
guarantee an adequately differentiated approach). 
 on the other hand, link national commitments 
to globally agreed goals; support, measure, and 
evaluate their implementation; guarantee trans-
parency; provide an anchor for the principle of 
accountability; generate learning effects; and pro-
mote capacity building and strengthen social 
support and ownership for the realization of the 
Post-2015 goals. 
Since the primary aim is to facilitate the implemen-
tation of the Post-2015 goals at the national level, the 
review process should take that as its starting point. 
Then, as a multi-level process, it should move on to a 
review at the global level in the HLPF (see Fig. 1, p. 25). 
First Cycle: Reviewing national commitments 
The heads of state and government of the UN Member 
States are expected to adopt the Post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda at a UN Summit in September 
2015. The UN General Assembly could take this occa-
sion to call upon Member States to formulate their 
own national commitments on each of the Sustain-
able Development Goals.90 The introduction to the 
OWG proposal for SDGs invites governments to trans-
late the aspirational global targets into their “own 
national targets guided by the global level of ambition 
but taking into account national circumstances”.91 
The bottom-up procedure outlined there would not 
only increase identification with the SDGs (ownership) 
but would also enable differentiated implementation 
of the goals by the individual member states. 
90  This is in line with The Dashboard Proposal. A First Approach 
by Colombia and Guatemala (New York, June 17, 2013, http:// 
www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Dashboard 
ProposalColombiaGuatemala.pdf (accessed July 23, 2014). 
91  Introduction to the Proposal of the OWG (see note 5), para. 18. 
Ideally, Member States’ commitments should also 
be articulated and integrated into their national sus-
tainability or development strategies. Germany, for 
example, has already begun to review its national sus-
tainability strategy. The State Secretaries’ Committee 
for Sustainable Development, which includes repre-
sentatives of all of the departments of the federal 
government and is chaired by the Head of the Federal 
Chancellery, has the task of further developing and 
monitoring the sustainability strategy. It commis-
sioned the German Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment to conduct consultations on this subject through-
out 2015. As part of this process, not only should Ger-
many align its national targets and indicators with the 
Post-2015 goals; the German government should also 
discuss and clearly formulate its own national com-
mitments for the given time frame up to 2030. The 
entire federal government, parliament, the states and 
local governments, and relevant societal stakeholders 
should be involved in this process. The new German 
sustainability strategy is supposed to be presented 
in 2016. Following that, the Federal Statistical Office 
will produce an indicator report that will be used as 
the basis for the government’s progress report on the 
sustainability strategy. What would be new here is 
that Germany could consider presenting its revised 
national strategy and progress report for review at the 
UN level. 
All Member State governments should be called 
upon to work towards the highest possible level of 
transparency and participation in developing their 
own national commitments and sustainable develop-
ment strategies. National parliaments, which have the 
constitutional responsibility of holding their govern-
ments accountable, should be involved more closely in 
this process. In Germany, the Parliamentary Body for 
Sustainable Development (PBNE) regularly discusses 
the National Sustainability Strategy, progress on its 
implementation, and its further development. They 
also assess new legislation based on whether it is for-
mally in line with the National Sustainability Strategy. 
Furthermore, national consultation processes should 
be carried out. The German Federal Press Office hosts 
online dialogues on the subject every four years. 
There are also other forums for dialogue, including  
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* In a five-year cycle: The Member States in one of the five UN Regional Groups would be called upon every five years to take part in the voluntary “HLPF Mutual Country Review” and to 
present their national commitments on all SDGs and their respective progress reports on the implementation of these commitments (see Fig. 2, p. 29). 
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Proposal for a “Commit and Review” Process for the Post-2015 SDGs 
the various activities of the German Council for Sustain-
able Development (RNE). For many local and national 
NGOs, the UN discussion of the SDGs up to now has 
been quite abstract. If the global goals and targets were 
broken down into national strategies and commit-
ments for sustainable development, this could change. 
All governments would then be asked to submit 
their national commitments in the Post-2015 goal areas 
to the UN. During the first five-year cycle (2016–2020) 
of the HLPF Review, each year, the Member States in 
one of the five UN regional groups could be invited to 
voluntarily present and discuss their national commit-
ments.92 
First, the review should examine whether national 
commitments (including benchmarks for the refer-
ence period) are sufficiently specific and ambitious, but at 
the same time, realistic.93 It should also ensure that all 
national commitments added together actually cor-
respond to the global goals and targets, and that the 
burdens are distributed fairly according to equity 
indicators.94 Donor countries (both the traditional 
donor countries and the newly industrialized coun-
tries as new donors) should be called upon to clearly 
state their commitments to provide funding for im-
plementation to developing countries. 
Second, the HLPF review of national commitments 
should evaluate whether states have the necessary 
means of implementation at their disposal and where 
additional resources need to be mobilized.95 Ideally, 
92  The five UN regional groups are the African Group, the 
Asia-Pacific, the Latin American and Caribbean Group, 
the Eastern European Group, and the Western European and 
Others Group, which includes the USA, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand (the so-called WEOG, to which Germany 
belongs as well). Not completely corresponding to this regional 
division, there are five UN Regional Commissions (UN ECA, 
ESCAP, ESCWA, ECLAC, and ECE), which are the local head-
quarters for the General Assembly and ECOSOC in their 
respective regions. 
93  See Eibe Riedel, Jan-Michael Arend, and Ana María Suárez 
Franco, Indicators, Benchmarks, Scoping, Assessment, FES Back-
ground Paper (Berlin and Geneva: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 
September 2010), http://www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/ 
documents/HumanRights/6July10_BackgroundPaper_IBSA.pdf 
(accessed September 30, 2014). This “scoping process” is a key 
component of the “IBSA” procedure developed for use in the 
field of human rights. 
94  For the climate field, see Climate Action Network (CAN), 
Equity Reference Framework at the UNFCCC Process, CAN Discussion 
Paper (2013). See also Metz, Making a Pledge and Review System 
Work (see note 65). 
95  UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of the HLPF (see 
note 8), para. 8: “Decides that the forum, under the auspices 
of the Economic and Social Council, shall conduct regular 
the results of the first review cycle should indicate 
where countries—in particular the least developed 
countries—need international support in building and 
developing capacities for the implementation of SDGs. 
If this would inform development cooperation, it 
could also provide a crucial incentive for developing 
countries to take part in the review. At the same time, 
in the first cycle, the HLPF review should consider the 
extent to which countries intend to and actually do 
mobilize their own resources for sustainable develop-
ment. In this context, discussion could take place on 
effective practices and instruments—for instance, 
those used to build a sustainable tax and social sys-
tems—as well as tested approaches to crisis prevention 
or fighting corruption. Additional financing options 
are highlighted in the report of the Intergovernmental 
Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development 
Financing (ICESDF) and the third UN Financing for 
Development Conference in Addis Ababa in mid-July 
2015 will further explore these issues. 
The review process should also consider and facili-
tate access to resource-efficient and environmentally 
friendly technological innovations. The newly indus-
trialized countries in particular are calling for action 
in this area. For years now, the UN has been consider-
ing possible mechanisms of technology transfer.96 In 
order for progress to be made in this area, conflicts 
over intellectual property issues would have to be 
resolved and incentives for technology transfer need 
to be created. The additional costs of “leapfrogging” 
in technological innovation could be covered, for 
example, with funds from the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF). Often, states do not take full advantage 
of the resources available from international funds 
like these. The review should help to identify needs 
and link countries with the assistance that they require, 
whether it be technical assistance, financing, or tech-
nology. 
If all this can be achieved, the review could help to 
ensure that different parties’ interests in two key areas 
reviews, starting in 2016, on the follow-up and implementa-
tion of sustainable development commitments and objectives, 
including those related to the means of implementation.” 
96  See the Post-2015 dialogues on the subject arranged under 
the direction of the General Assembly, http://www.un.org/en/ 
ga/president/68/pdf/letters/3262014One_Day_Structured_Dial
ogues-26 March2014.pdf (accessed July 27, 2014). See also the 
report of the Secretary-General, which introduces concrete 
options for a mechanism, UNGA, Options for a Facilitation Mecha-
nism that Promotes the Development, Transfer and Dissemination of 
Clean and Environmentally Sound Technologies, UN-Doc. A/67/348 
(New York, September 2012). 
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Second cycle: Reviewing the implementation of national commitments 
are taken into account: means of implementation and 
differentiated responsibilities. The newly industrial-
ized and developing countries could monitor whether 
the donor countries are living up to their financial 
commitments and are doing more to promote tech-
nology transfer. Donor countries could evaluate 
whether newly industrialized and developing coun-
tries are also mobilizing their own resources and 
whether the former also make their own funding 
commitments. 
Second cycle: Reviewing the implementation 
of national commitments 
In the second cycle, the review of implementation of 
national commitments would begin. Since national 
governments are accountable primarily to their own 
citizens, this review cycle should begin again at the 
national level, immediately after the discussion of the 
national commitments in the HLPF. 
The Member States should produce national (pro-
gress) reports, which they should discuss in the draft 
stage in parliament, during consultation processes, 
and/or with independent sustainable development 
councils.97 Efforts will need to be undertaken at an 
early stage to strengthen the necessary institutional 
capacities. In developing countries, the UN Country 
Teams should provide assistance upon request. More-
over, local forms of monitoring should be used to 
collect information on whether sustainability policies 
are actually having a useful impact at the local level. 
The outcomes of participatory monitoring and 
accountability processes led by civil society organiza-
tions (e.g., “citizen reviews”) could be taken into con-
sideration.98 
Building on these national processes, the next step 
could be regional review processes. First, a regional 
peer review would accommodate those states that do 
97  See also UNOSD, 2014 Incheon Communiqué. Ready to Deliver 
the Post-2015 agenda? (Incheon [South Korea], April 11, 2014), 
http://www.unosd.org/content/documents/5672014%20Incheon
%20Communique%202014-04-13%20A4.pdf (accessed July 27, 
2014), para. 4.3: “NCSDs and similar institutions, together 
with national parliaments, administrative structures, and 
statistical and audit offices should provide comprehensive 
scrutiny programmes in order to report on and effectively 
communicate progress toward national sustainable develop-
ment objectives.” 
98  See The World We Want, Participatory Monitoring and 
Accountability (online), http://www.worldwewant2015.org/ 
accountability2015 (accessed July 17, 2014). 
not want to report, at least not directly or right away, 
at the UN level. In the regional review context, Member 
States could exchange ideas on joint and cross-border 
challenges with neighboring states and discuss best 
practices for implementing the SDGs at the national 
and local level. Second, the regional reviews could 
prepare for the review on the global level.99 Regional 
reviews could include the following two elements: 
 A Country Review: In the following, it is proposed that 
each year, the Member States in one of the five UN 
regional groups be called upon to voluntarily pre-
sent their national reports on the implementation of 
their national commitments for achieving the Post-
2015 goals (see Fig. 1, p. 25). At the regional level, 
this would leave five years to provide assistance to 
Member States in preparing for their reports and 
voluntary presentations in the HLPF framework at 
the global level. 
 A Thematic Review: Starting in 2016, the five UN 
Regional Commissions could compile an annual 
synthesis report based on the input of their Mem-
ber States on the respective annual thematic focus 
of the HLPF.100 This report could focus on the over-
all situation in the thematic focus area and less on 
the performance of individual states. The annex to 
the report could list the relevant data from the Mem-
ber States on their national Post-2015 commitments 
in the respective focus area. 
The regional reviews could be organized by the 
UN Regional Commissions, which would need to be 
strengthened for this purpose. It would also be advis-
able that they cooperate with existing regional organi-
zations and regional development banks. For efficiency 
reasons, it would make sense to build on existing 
review processes (see also p. 18). 
Some have proposed the idea of carrying out the 
Post-2015 reviews exclusively at the regional level and 
discussing only the results of these reviews during the 
HLPF meetings. However, if national progress reports 
were not discussed at all at the global level, this would 
compromise the idea of shared responsibility and mutu-
al review of national-level implementation, and it 
would also imply a loss of international visibility and 
of the resulting mutual peer pressure. 
99  This follows UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of 
the HLPF (see note 8), para. 7f.: “Shall benefit from regional 
preparatory processes.” 
100  Ibid., para. 7c: “[Meetings of the forum s]hall have a the-
matic focus […] in line with the thematic focus of the activities 
of the Council and consistent with the Post-2015 develop-
ment agenda” (emphasis added). 
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Proposal for a “Commit and Review” Process for the Post-2015 SDGs 
The design of the HLPF Review at the 
global level 
The resolution on the HLPF states that the review 
should build on the AMR conducted under the auspices 
of ECOSOC and should replace it as of 2016 (see also 
p. 15). The new HLPF Review could include both of the 
aforementioned components that have already also 
been parts of the AMR: a Thematic Review and a 
Mutual Country Review. 
1) The Thematic Review could concentrate on the 
progress of implementation in the area of the HLPF’s 
annually changing thematic focus. The regional the-
matic reports, the thematic report of the UN Secretary-
General, and further reports from the UN entities 
responsible for the respective thematic area would 
form the basis for this first part of the global review 
in the HLPF, which would be quite similar to the the-
matic review process that has existed up to now in the 
AMR. This part of the review process would allow for 
in-depth analysis and would also provide an opportu-
nity to focus more intensively on new and emerging, 
cross-cutting, or particularly urgent issues. 
2) The second part of the HLPF Review on the global 
level would be the Mutual Country Review. This would 
take a broader view, covering all of the Post-2015 tar-
get areas and giving the individual Member States the 
opportunity to voluntarily present and discuss their 
national implementation experiences. Since the HLPF 
meets only eight days per year, the majority of the 
review process would be held on behalf of the HLPF 
under the auspices of ECOSOC (replacing the AMR). 
During the actual meeting of the HLPF in July, the 
results could be evaluated and discussed, which would 
provide the empirical basis for the political leadership, 
guidance, and recommendations that the HLPF is man-
dated to provide in global sustainability policy. 
Following the model of the UPR process under 
the HRC, the HLPF Mutual Country Review (see Fig. 2, 
p. 29) should be based on three documents: a. National 
reports, b. Information from the UN entities, and 
c. Reports from Major Groups and other stakeholders. 
 
a. At the start of the second cycle, beginning in 2021, 
the Member States in one of the regional groups would 
be asked to hand in their national reports on the imple-
mentation of their commitments (i.e., every five years, 
preferably no later than the end of September of the 
year prior to the review). The reports should cover all 
of the Post-2015 goals following a standardized tem-
plate, but allowing states to focus on selected targets 
and indicators. The reports should not only describe 
what progress has been achieved but also discuss prob-
lems and obstacles to implementation. This is the pre-
condition for learning and tailored support on critical 
issues. The national reports would be published online 
and should be supplemented by information from the 
UN entities and non-governmental groups (preferably 
by the end of January of the review year at the latest). 
 
b. UN institutions should contribute their expertise and 
the existing country-specific data they have at their 
disposal on the various goal areas, also building on 
the results of existing sectoral reviews. To collect, con-
dense, and communicate the relevant information, 
the UN should form a committee, building on the 
positive experiences with the former UN Interagency 
Committee on Sustainable Development and its Task 
Manager System. Such a committee could be organized 
under the Chief Executives Board for Coordination 
(CEB). It could follow the Inter-Agency and Expert 
Group on MDG Indicators and the Technical Support 
Team (TST), which up to now has supported MDG 
monitoring and in some cases the work of the nego-
tiation group on the SDGs. 
An alternative idea under consideration is to refer 
the Post-2015 review to the UN institutions 
responsible for a particular area (environmental issues 
would be dealt with by the UNEP, health issues by the 
WHO, etc.) and only present a synthesis report in the 
HLPF. However, this would undermine the integrated 
approach that has been taken toward the Post-2015 
goals up to now, lead to multiple (possibly not very 
coherent) procedures, and above all, mean a loss of 
visibility. Nevertheless, the monitoring process will 
undoubtedly have to be organized in a decentralized, 
subsidiary way. The data collected would then form 
the basis for UN entities’ analysis and for their reports 
for the Thematic Review. 
The annual Global Sustainable Development Report 
(GSDR) of the UN Secretary-General could also provide 
an important basis for the HLPF Review. This report 
was proposed during the Rio+20 Conference, but there 
is still disagreement on what form it should take and 
what function it should serve in the Post-2015 review 
process.101 One option would be to build on existing 
reports, to summarize the results of data monitoring 
101  At the HLPF in July 2014 in New York, a draft report was 
presented but it contained only vague statements on how 
the GSDR would be linked to the future Post-2015 monitoring 
and review mechanisms, see http://sustainabledevelopment. 
un.org/index.php?menu=1621 (accessed July 28, 2014). 
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The design of the HLPF Review at the global level 
in all target areas and then have these analyzed and 
evaluated by experts (“assessment of assessments”). 
Here, indications of new challenges and scenario 
analyses would be particularly valuable. What remains 
under debate is who should write the report: the 
experts, the UN, or the participants in a multi-stake-
holder process. In the latter case, in particular, the 
review could conceivably be linked with national and 
regional review processes. 
 
c. Non-governmental observers (Major Groups and other stake-
holders) should be given the opportunity to submit 
positions and to provide information.102 The resolu-
tion on the HLPF grants them extensive rights of par-
ticipation.103 As with the UPR, their reports and oral 
statements should be an integral component of the 
review process. Discussions should give priority to 
comments from national-level non-governmental civil 
society groups and other stakeholders as well as com-
ments from independent national sustainable devel-
opment councils (which all Member States should be 
urged to establish). An ombudsperson could mediate 
in cases of complaints concerning problems of ad-
equate participation rights at the national, regional, 
or international level. 
If Member States deem it appropriate, independent 
experts could also be asked to deliver reports on new 
or previously neglected issues on which there is little 
or no UN expertise or NGO activity. Many other review 
processes use external expertise (see above, pp. 15ff.). 
If states agree, the experts should be offered the oppor-
tunity to participate in the preparatory country or 
regional reviews and, if deemed necessary, to conduct 
further local visits. To take the (usually neglected) 
interests of future generations more fully into account, 
it would also be advisable to appoint a high-level rep-
resentative for future generations to speak for their 
interests in the review process. Experts could also be 
commissioned to provide reports on other overarching 
and systemic questions. 
To handle the massive quantity of data produced, 
all of the actors in the process should submit their 
reports to the secretariat serving the HLPF (following 
the model of the UPR), which would then compile the  
102  See the recommendations by Strandenaes, Participatory 
Democracy (see note 46). 
103  UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of the HLPF (see 
note 8), paragraphs 14 and 15, which include the statement: 
“Representatives of the major groups and other relevant 
stakeholders shall be allowed: To attend all official meetings 
of the forum.” 
Figure 2 
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Proposal for a “Commit and Review” Process for the Post-2015 SDGs 
relevant information into two synthesis reports that 
would supplement the national reports. This task would 
have to be completed at the latest by the end of Feb-
ruary of the review year. 
 
The core component of the Mutual Country Review 
should be the presentation and discussion of national 
reports, which could take place at the earliest in 
April on behalf of the HLPF under the auspices of the 
ECOSOC104 (instead of the AMR). The presentations 
should be made by high-level elected officials from the 
capitals and should follow a harmonized format and 
template.105 Of course, it would be impossible to pre-
sent the national reports in their entirety. Instead, 
the states under review could be asked to discuss one 
positive example of their implementation efforts for each 
goal that could provide inspiration to other states, as 
well as one area in which they face particular challenges 
and would like feedback and support. Based on the 
three submitted reports and the presentation, the 
other states could then ask questions and give recom-
mendations. To achieve the greatest possible trans-
parency and participation, the meetings should be 
broadcast by live UN-TV webcast (as is the case with 
the UPR). Parallel to this, the secretariat should open 
up an Internet-based discussion (as is done with the 
AMR).106 
Also following the UPR model, a troika of countries 
should be formed to facilitate and report on the pro-
cess. It should consist of one country selected by the 
country under review from the same regional group 
and two countries from other regional groups, selected 
by lot from all eligible countries. Only countries that 
commit to participate in the review process them-
selves would be eligible. To prevent past or present 
conflicts from disrupting the process, countries that 
are or were recently involved in conflicts with the 
country under review would be excluded from mem-
104  UNGA, The Future We Want (see note 1), para. 82: “We re-
affirm that the Economic and Social Council is a principal 
body for policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations 
on issues of economic and social development.” 
105  See also ECOSOC, The Contribution of the Economic and Social 
Council (see note 44), para. 63: “While the reviews would remain 
voluntary, the mutual reviews would adopt a more rigorous 
approach, including developing a standardized analytical 
and reporting framework; developing follow-up and report 
back mechanisms; incorporating available national statistical 
data; and incorporating renewed participatory approaches 
into the process.” 
106  See the e-discussion platform at http://www.un.org/en/ 
ecosoc/newfunct/amredis2014.shtml (accessed July 27, 2014). 
bership in the troika. As in the UPR, countries under 
review should have the right to veto one of the three 
troika members. 
After the presentations, the troika would compile a 
summary of the discussion and recommendations into 
a country report. Countries would then be asked to 
respond to all of the recommendations, either accept-
ing or rejecting them. This would demand a speedy 
and efficient process. It would help if states appointed 
a high-level coordination body in advance to handle 
these decisions. All country reports, including recom-
mendations and the commentaries by the state under 
review, would then be submitted to the HLPF. They 
could be discussed in the plenary of the HLPF in July, 
that is, during the first five days of the HLPF meeting 
under the auspices of the ECOSOC. As in the UPR, non-
governmental observers would be allowed to speak 
during this debate of the reports in the plenary ses-
sions only. 
During the subsequent three-day ministerial segment, 
negotiations should be conducted over how the results 
of the thematic and country reviews should be inte-
grated into the Ministerial Declaration that would report 
the outcomes of the HLPF Review to the UN General 
Assembly.107 Although this document could not be 
very comprehensive or in-depth, its main objective 
would be to highlight key issues and point out prob-
lems and potentials for improvement. Past experience 
with the UPR has shown that a multilateral impulse 
of this kind can be valuable—and although it may not 
always be fully effective, the overall outcomes are 
encouraging enough that the effort appears justified. 
This is an extremely tight schedule—especially in 
view of the wide thematic scope of the Post-2015 goals 
and the coordination they will require. In order for 
such a review to be successful, the institutional capa-
bilities on the side of the Member States and on the 
UN side will have to be strengthened. Above all, devel-
oping countries should be supported in their efforts in 
the context of the review process. For these and other 
tasks, capacities in the secretariat that serves the HLPF 
will need to be expanded and developed. The crucial 
importance of secretariats has become evident in the 
past (see also p. 22).108 One possibility would be to 
107  According to UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of 
the HLPF (see note 8), para. 7g, this is to take place through the 
report of the Economic and Social Council to the General 
Assembly (“a negotiated ministerial declaration for inclusion 
in the report of the Council to the General Assembly”). 
108  See also Sikina Jinnah, “Singing the Unsung: Secretariats 
in Global Environmental Politics,” in The Roads from Rio. Lessons 
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The design of the HLPF Review at the global level 
assign the parts of the United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) Division for 
Sustainable Development (DSD) that have supported 
the CSD up to now and the parts of the Office for 
ECOSOC Support and Coordination (OESC) that are 
responsible for the AMR up to 2015 to the HLPF, and 
to equip them with the necessary resources. The secre-
tariat should also make the information collected 
during the HLPF Reviews available on a website. This 
would make information on successful policies and 
best practices accessible even outside of the current 
review process and enable others to profit from the 
knowledge-sharing elements of the review. 
 
 
Learned from Twenty Years of Multilateral Environmental Negotiations, 
ed. Pamela Chasek and Lynn M. Wagner (New York, 2012), 
107–26; Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International 
Environmental Bureaucracies, ed. Frank Biermann and Bernd 
Siebenhüner (Cambridge, Mass., et al., 2009). 
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The proposed “Commit and Review” process could 
and should also be open to non-governmental initia-
tives such as the partnerships for sustainable development 
launched in Johannesburg in 2002 and the voluntary 
commitments formulated in Rio in 2012. These multi-
stakeholder initiatives and partnerships are seen by 
many as additional and very flexible means that could 
be used to effectively implement sustainable develop-
ment goals. Up to now, however, the overall picture 
as regards their performance is mixed and somewhat 
disappointing.109 The UN should therefore evaluate 
these initiatives to identify success factors and to deter-
mine which ones have potential to be replicated or 
scaled-up. 
Recent developments 
Member States have already discussed these issues in 
various formal and informal meetings. During the 
General Assembly and ECOSOC Joint Thematic Debate 
and Forum on Partnerships in April 2014, for example, 
a panel called for “a robust, transparent, comprehen-
sive and independent accountability framework” for 
partnerships related to the Post-2015 development 
agenda, to “monitor progress at partnerships level”.110 
During the debate, Brazil recommended that “UN 
involvement in partnerships must be subjected to the 
scrutiny and standards of intergovernmental bodies 
109  Transnational Partnerships. Effectively Providing for Sustainable 
Development?, ed. Marianne Beisheim and Andrea Liese (Basing-
stoke, 2014). Public-Private Partnerships for Sustainable Development: 
Emergence, Influence and Legitimacy, ed. Philipp Pattberg, Frank 
Biermann, Sander Chan, and Aysem Mert (Cheltenham 2012). See 
also Karin Bäckstrand and M. Kylsäter, “Old wine in new 
bottles? The legitimation and delegitimation of UN public–
private partnerships for sustainable development from the 
Johannesburg Summit to the Rio+20 Summit”, Globalizations, 
11(3), 331–47. 
110  Summary of the key messages of the General Assembly and 
ECOSOC Joint Thematic Debate/Forum on Partnerships “The role of 
partnerships in the implementation of the post-2015 development 
agenda”, UN Headquarters, April 9–10, 2014, p. 3. 
such as the General Assembly, ECOSOC or the High 
Level Political Forum”.111 
The UN Development Group convened Post-2015 
dialogues on partnerships with civil society through-
out 2014. NGOs in particular have urged that national 
and international platforms and accountability mecha-
nisms be created as soon as possible for voluntary 
initiatives. The call for an ambitious accountability 
mechanism at the international level for voluntary 
commitments and partnerships was already heard 
prior to the Rio+20 conference.112 
Some new UN approaches to partnerships and other 
non-governmental initiatives for sustainable develop-
ment are already beginning to take shape. The secre-
tariat has established specific criteria for inclusion in 
its new sustainable development knowledge platform 
SD in Action, a comprehensive registry of both partner-
ships and Rio+20 voluntary commitments: 
“All commitments to be registered should be spe-
cific, measurable, funded, new […] In order to facilitate 
periodic reporting on progress of implementation, it 
is important that at least one tangible deliverable is 
specified, along with the estimated timeline for com-
pletion. Resources devoted to the delivery of commit-
ments should also be specified.”113 
So far, however, the mandate does not include a 
strong mechanism for monitoring or ensuring account-
ability. All initiatives are asked to provide voluntary 
periodic reports on their activities. To this end, UNDESA 
provides a downloadable questionnaire on the SMART 
(specific, measurable, achievable, resource-based, and 
time-bound) criteria that initiatives are asked to use as 
111  United Nations: Latin America cautions against Partnerships 
without effective governance, Third World Network Info Service 
on UN Sustainable Development, May 14, 2004. 
112  See Joseph Foti, Promises Kept: Ensuring Ambition and 
Accountability through a Rio+20 “Compendium of Commitments”, 
Working Paper (Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 
2012); Marianne Beisheim, Partnerships for Sustainable Develop-
ment. Why and How Rio+20 Must Improve the Framework for Multi-
stakeholder Partnerships, SWP Research Paper 3/2012 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2012). 
113  See UNCSD, Registry of Commitments for Sustainable Develop-
ment. Information Note (New York, 2012), http://www.uncsd 
2012.org/content/documents/524Info%20Note_Registry%20 
of%20Commitments%20120712.pdf (accessed July 27, 2014). 
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a guideline for their activities. The monthly “SD in 
Action” newsletter and an annual special report are 
planned as means of providing information on the 
reports.114 It remains unclear, however, whether the 
initiatives are actually complying with the reporting 
requirement. Already the criteria and guidelines for 
partnerships that were decided at CSD 11 in 2003 
asked partnerships to submit a regular report at least 
on a biennial basis.115 However, such obligations have 
never been implemented consistently and have been 
largely ignored by partnerships, without this resulting 
in any repercussions.116 This should change. 
Options for an improved accountability 
framework for partnerships 
A basic option to improve the overall UN framework 
for partnerships would be to enhance the level of trans-
parency. It would be advisable for the UN to require all 
partnerships in the SD in Action Registry to submit a 
report of activities along a standardized template at 
least once every two years. Partnerships that fail to 
submit reports should be reminded, and if they still 
fail to respond within a certain period, they should be 
excluded from the new registry. All incoming reports 
should be published on the SD in Action website with 
a comment function. This would enable civil society 
groups and other stakeholders to act as critical observ-
ers and watchdogs, pointing out discrepancies. To sup-
port this process, NGOs should use their websites to 
publish their own documentation.117 Additionally, the 
114  UNDESA, Voluntary Commitments and Partnerships for Sus-
tainable Development. A Special Edition of the SD in Action News-
letter, New York 2013. 
115  Cf. UNCSD, Partnerships for Sustainable Development, http:// 
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/partnerships_for_sd.pdf 
(accessed July 27, 2014), para. 23b. See also ECOSOC, The Im-
plementation Track for Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation: Future Programme, Organisation and Methods of 
Work of the Commission on Sustainable Development, Draft Reso-
lution Recommended by the Commission for Adoption by 
the Council (New York, May 14, 2003), http://www.un.org/ 
esa/sustdev/csd/csd11/csd11res.pdf (accessed July 22, 2014). 
116  In 2003, only half of the partnerships in the database 
responded to an update request from the CSD secretariat. 
Cf. Amy Stewart, Partnerships for Water and Sanitation in Africa, 
Report for the 16th Session of the Commission on Sustain-
able Development, London: Stakeholder Forum, April 2008, 
p. 14. 
117  Cf., e.g., the “Cloud of Commitments” of the Natural 
Resources Defence Council (NRDC), http://www. 
cloudofcommitments. org (accessed October 9, 2014). 
UN should consider developing and defining ex-ante 
minimum criteria that partnerships would be expected 
to fulfill before being allowed to register. 
Moreover, transnational initiatives could be asked 
to participate in a global-level review, and national 
initiatives could be evaluated as a part of national 
efforts. At the country level, governments could be 
encouraged to install a single, enabling multi-stake-
holder platform with a build-in accountability mecha-
nism for partnerships.118 At the UN level, setting up 
a central platform for review would be one option. The 
resolution on the HLPF stipulates explicitly that the 
HLPF Review “shall provide a platform for partner-
ships.”119 The HLPF meeting in June 2014 featured a 
thematic session on “Multi-stakeholder partnerships 
and voluntary commitments for sustainable develop-
ment—ensuring accountability for all”; the prepara-
tory paper states the need to ensure accountability 
through an enabling institutional environment and 
relevant reporting requirements.120 What this means 
precisely still remains to be negotiated and specified. 
It is also still unclear what will become of the former 
CSD, now ECOSOC Forum on Partnerships, which up to 
now has been more of a nonbinding platform for ex-
change and debate. Going beyond this, the UN Secre-
tary-General has proposed that a new partnership facility 
be established121 to ensure greater accountability and 
transparency.122 While the idea of setting up additional 
accountability, integrity, transparency, and support 
118  World Vision International, Getting Intentional: Cross-sector 
Partnerships, Business and the Post-2015 Development Agenda (Geneva 
et al., June 2014), 22. 
119  UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of the HLPF (see 
note 8), para. 8c. “Shall provide a platform for partnerships, 
including through the participation of major groups and 
other stakeholders.” See also President of the General Assem-
bly, Summary of the First Meeting of the High-Level Political Forum 
on Sustainable Development, UN-Doc. A/68/588 (New York, Novem-
ber 2013), para. 27: “Leaders and other participants also 
recalled the agreement that the high-level political forum 
should provide, starting in 2016, a transparent, voluntary, 
State-led review mechanism open to partnerships to monitor com-
mitments” (emphasis added). 
120  UNDESA, Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable devel-
opment, HLPF Issue Brief 3, New York 2014. 
121  UNGA, A Life of Dignity for All. Accelerating Progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals and Advancing the United Nations 
Development Agenda beyond 2015, Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, UN-Doc. A/68/202 (New York, July 26, 2013), para. 69; 
see also: Enhanced Cooperation between the United Nations and all 
Relevant Partners, in Particular the Private Sector, Report of the 
Secretary-General, UN-Doc. A/68/326 (New York, August 2013). 
122  UNGA, Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2014–
2015, UN-Doc. A/68/6, Sect. 1 (New York, May 21, 2013), 66f. 
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measures has been welcomed by most Member States, 
there have been serious conflicts around design, staff-
ing, and funding issues. 
Taking a more decentralized approach, the UN could 
alternatively ask its specialized agencies, commissions, 
funds, and programs to assess “their” partnerships in 
a consistent format and report the results to the HLPF. 
One underlying principle could be that partnerships 
should better align their deliverables to specific sus-
tainable development goals and targets. This has 
already been promoted in the context of the Third 
International Conference on Small Island Developing 
States. Accordingly, partnerships would also have to 
align themselves with the intergovernmental legis-
lation and principles of international organizations 
responsible for the particular area. The private sector 
should also work to see that their standards for sus-
tainability reporting are adapted for use in reports 
produced in the framework of Post-2015 reviews.123 
Some experts and NGOs have also urged that the UN 
contracts independent third-party reviews.124 The 
UN Secretary-General’s partnership initiative “Every 
Woman Every Child”, for example, combines a Com-
mission on Information and Accountability with an 
Independent Expert Reviewing Group. To keep the 
costs and effort for the process within bounds, how-
ever, one could consider limiting such expert reviews 
to only the most interesting or problematic partner-
ships. 
 
 
123  For example, the progress reports of the Global Compact 
or other company sustainability reports created following the 
guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
124  Bernstein, The Role and Place of the High-Level Political Forum 
(see note 55), and Steven Bernstein et al., Coherent Governance, 
the UN and the SDGs, Post2015/UNU-IAS Policy Brief No. 4 (Tokyo: 
United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of 
Sustainability, 2014). 
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The “Commit and Review” process described here 
would give the states sovereign control over their 
national commitments, but it also ties these back into 
the globally agreed Post-2015 agenda and goals with 
the aim of increasing accountability and improving 
capacities for implementation. In a multi-level process 
(see Fig. 1, p. 25), the UN Member States would be 
called upon, first, to define and submit their national 
commitments. In the first five-year cycle of the review 
process (2016–2020), these national commitments 
could first be assessed for appropriateness and adequa-
cy. This review should also determine at this stage 
whether states have the enabling means of implementa-
tion (e.g., funding, technology or expertise) at their 
disposal. If not, they should be provided with support 
to mobilize the necessary resources. This would pro-
vide an incentive for developing countries in particu-
lar to participate in the review process. 
In the second five-year cycle, the review of implemen-
tation of national commitments would begin. Since 
governments are accountable first and foremost to 
their own populations, the review cycle should take 
the national level as its starting point. Here, govern-
ments should prepare annual progress reports and 
discuss them in the framework of consultation 
procedures with broad-based societal participation. 
A regional “peer review” could build on these national 
processes, offer a platform for exchange between the 
countries in a region, and help to prepare for the 
global part of the review. It could build on existing 
regional reviews and be facilitated by the UN Regional 
Commissions in cooperation with other regional 
organizations and regional development banks. 
On the global level, the Member States in a given 
regional group would be called upon to present their 
national reports in the framework of a mutual review 
process starting in 2021. The national reports should 
cover not only progress but also problems and obstacles 
to implementation. This is essential in promoting 
learning and providing targeted support on critical 
issues. In addition, the review could refer to the sup-
plementary reports with information from the UN and 
Major Groups and other stakeholders. The centerpiece 
of the annual Mutual Country Reviews carried out 
under the auspices of the ECOSOC should be the volun-
tary presentations of the national reports and their 
interactive discussion. Countries could be encouraged 
to present one positive example for each of the 17 
SDGs that could inspire others to follow suit, and 
discuss one particularly challenging area under each 
goal in which they would like to receive feedback and 
support. Then there would be a round of questions, 
and recommendations would be made. The outcome 
reports would be discussed during the HLPF plenary 
session, which would constitute an empirical basis for 
the political guidance the HLPF is mandated to pro-
vide. Accordingly, the review could also inform the 
HLPF’s Ministerial Declaration. 
Several issues still remain to be solved: The key 
question is, of course, what kind of universal Post-
2015 review would be accepted by all of the UN Mem-
ber States. The review process recommended here fully 
respects national sovereignty by working with national 
voluntary commitments and by focusing on the 
accountability of national governments to their own 
people. Accordingly, the process starts from the bot-
tom up at the national level. Within the voluntary 
mutual review at the international level, states would 
be reviewed in line with the national targets and 
commitments that they set for themselves. To be effec-
tive, the review mechanism also needs to “show some 
teeth” by calling for a voluntary but universal mutual 
review, with high transparency and precise guidelines 
for review, and by involving non-governmental groups 
and experts. Another big question is whether the donor 
countries will accept having their commitments to 
provide means of implementation considered as an 
integral part of the review. SDG 17 is dealing with 
means of implementation and the global partnership 
for sustainable development and so are several targets 
under other SDGs —it would thus be logical to also 
review these commitments. In that context, the review 
should also evaluate national and transnational part-
nerships for sustainable development. 
Questions also arise in regard to the practicability 
of the procedure and its financing. The process is quite 
complex—but the same can be said of the Post-2015 
agenda itself, which covers nearly all of the areas in 
which the UN is active and also highlights key prior-
ities in each of these areas as the focus of intensive 
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work starting in 2016. The review process needs to be 
adequate to these objectives. If many or even all Mem-
ber States wanted to take part in the global-level review, 
not only would personnel capacities be stretched 
thin; time would be tight as well (bearing in mind the 
limited number of days on which ECOSOC and the 
HLPF meets). It also remains uncertain whether all of 
the Member States would be willing to make their own 
contributions to funding the review and, in addition, 
to create a fund for financial and technical assistance 
that could be used to support the least developed 
countries participating in the review. 
The UN Member States are scheduled to complete 
their negotiations over the design of the monitoring 
and review mechanism for the Post-2015 SDGs and the 
HLPF review by September 2015. To create a Post-2015 
review process that is acceptable to all as well as 
effective, it is important to emphasize the potential 
added value of such a review process and promote it 
internationally. A Mutual Review based on the prin-
ciple of shared responsibility and reciprocity—in the 
spirit of the much-anticipated new Global Partnership 
for Sustainable Development—could help form the 
urgently needed multilateral consensus to work toward 
the Post-2015 agenda. Germany could campaign for 
this in Brussels, Geneva, New York, and in the frame-
work of its G7/G8 presidency. In order to build mutual 
trust in this process, the German government should 
announce its voluntary participation in the HLPF 
review in 2016 with its revised sustainable devel-
opment strategy. 
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AMR Annual Ministerial Review 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism 
AU African Union 
BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
CAN Climate Action Network 
CBDR Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
CEB Chief Executives Board for Coordination 
CSD Commission on Sustainable Development 
DCF Development Cooperation Forum 
DIE Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (German 
Development Institute, Bonn) 
DSD Division for Sustainable Development 
ECA (United Nations) Economic Commission for Africa 
ECE (United Nations) Economic Commission for Europe 
ECLAC (United Nations) Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council 
ERTs Expert Review Teams 
ESCAP (United Nations) Economic and Social Commission 
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EU European Union 
G20 Group of 20 
G77 Group of 77 
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ICESDF Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on 
Sustainable Development Financing 
IEAG Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data 
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IO International Organization 
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MDGs Millennium Development Goals 
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NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
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OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
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OMC Open Method of Coordination 
OWG Open Working Group 
PBNE Parlamentarischer Beirat für nachhaltige 
Entwicklung (Parliamentary Body for Sustainable 
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PREE Peer Review on Energy Efficiency 
QCPR Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review 
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SD Sustainable Development 
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals 
SMART Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Resource-Based, and 
Time-Bound 
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UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
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UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
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WHO World Health Organization 
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